Michigan Technology Law Review
Article 3
2022

Unreasonable: A Strict Liability Solution to the FTC’s Data Security
Problem
James C. Cooper
Antonin Scalia Law School

Bruce H. Kobayashi
Antonin Scalia Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mtlr
Part of the Information Security Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James C. Cooper & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Unreasonable: A Strict Liability Solution to the FTC’s Data
Security Problem, 28 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 257 (2022).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mtlr/vol28/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Technology Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

UNREASONABLE: A STRICT LIABILITY
SOLUTION TO THE FTC’S DATA SECURITY
PROBLEM
James C. Cooper * & Bruce H. Kobayashi **

ABSTRACT
For over two decades, the FTC creatively employed its capacious
statute to police against shoddy data practices. Although the FTC’s
actions were arguably needed at the time to fill a gap in enforcement,
there are reasons to believe that its current approach has outlived its
usefulness and is in serious need of updating. In particular, our analysis
shows that the FTC’s current approach to data security is unlikely to
instill anything close to optimal incentives for data holders. These
shortcomings cannot be fixed through changes to the FTC enforcement
approach, as they are largely generated by a mismatch between the tools
that Congress gave it over a century ago and what it needs to foster
firms’ incentives to mimic socially optimal levels of care for the data
they hold. Not only does the current framework likely suffer from
informational deficiencies attendant to its focus on “reasonable”
security that render liability standards uncertain, it also lacks the ability
to obtain the type of relief that will force firms to internalize the costs of
their data security decisions. We examine the problem of data security
enforcement through the lens of the economics of optimal precautions
and identify several reasons why a strict liability regime administered
by the FTC, under which firms pay for the expected harm from breaches
they cause, is likely to be superior to the current framework that revolves
around the concept of reasonableness. The benefits of strict liability flow
from the likelihood that firms do not fully internalize the costs and
benefits of their data security decisions and the relatively large
informational burdens associated with measuring actual and optimal
care under a negligence regime. We also show why in this informational
environment, strict liability is better than negligence for developing a
vibrant cyber insurance market, allowing for data security regulation to
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be de facto outsourced to insurers who will contract with firms for
optimal levels of care. Because these private contracts will harness
private information on costs and benefits from precautions, they are
likely to incentivize more efficient behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Data breaches are ubiquitous. They are no longer surprising or newsworthy, and now are just part of the background noise of everyday life. 1 The list
of well-known data breaches that have allowed hackers to acquire sensitive
personal and financial information is large, including well-known national
retail firms, 2 tech platforms, 3 banks, 4 health insurers, 5 and even federal and
state agencies. 6 And this is just the tip of the iceberg—unpublicized breaches
swamp those that are reported in the media. 7 Even with the announcement of
1.
Julia Carpenter & Bourree Lam, The Capital One Hack: Life in the Time of Breach
Fatigue, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2019, 3:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-capital-onehack-life-in-the-time-of-breach-fatigue-11564824600.
2.
See, e.g., Paul Ziobro & Danny Yadron, Target Now Says 70 Million People Hit in
Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2014, 8:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052702303754404579312232546392464; Shelly Banjo, Home Depot Hackers
Exposed 53 Million Email Addresses, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:03 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-hackers-used-password-stolen-from-vendor1415309282; David Uberti, Marriott Reveals Breach That Exposed Data of Up to 5.2 Million
Customers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2020, 4:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/marriott-reveals-breach-that-exposed-data-of-up-to-5-2-million-customers-11585686590.
3.
Robert McMillan & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Finds Hack Was Done by
Spammers, Not Foreign State, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2018, 8:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/facebook-tentatively-concludes-recent-hack-was-perpetrated-by-spammers1539821869; Greg Bensinger & Robert McMillan, Uber Reveals Data Breach and Cover-up,
Leading to Two Firings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/uber-reveals-data-breach-and-cover-up-leading-to-two-firings-1511305453; Robert McMillan, LinkedIn 2012 Data Breach May Have Hit Over 100 Million, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2016,
6:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/linkedin-2012-data-breach-may-have-hit-over-100million-1463675653; Joshua Jamerson, Myspace Breached by Hackers Before Memorial Day
Weekend, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2016, 9:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/myspacebreached-by-hackers-before-memorial-day-weekend-1464700772; Robert McMillan & Ryan
Knutson, Yahoo Triples Estimate of Breached Accounts to 3 Billion, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2017,
9:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-triples-estimate-of-breached-accounts-to-3-billion-1507062804.
4.
Peter Rudegeair, AnnaMaria Andriotis & David Benoit, Capital One Hack Hits the
Reputation of a Tech-Savvy Bank, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/capital-one-hack-hits-the-reputation-of-a-tech-savvy-bank-11564565402.
5.
Anna Wilde Mathews & Danny Yadron, Health Insurer Anthem Hit by Hackers,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 9:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurer-anthem-hitby-hackers-1423103720.
6.
John D. McKinnon & Laura Saunders, Breach at IRS Exposes Tax Returns, WALL
ST. J. (May 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/criminals-steal-taxpayer-data-via-irs-webservice-1432672691; Damian Paletta, OPM Breach Was Enormous, FBI Director Says, WALL
ST. J. (July 8, 2015, 6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/breach-was-enormous-fbi-director-says-1436395157. This list also includes our employer. See Cara Garretson, George Mason
University Suffers Security Breach, NETWORK WORLD (Jan. 12, 2005, 12:00 AM),
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2318057/george-mason-university-suffers-securitybreach.html.
7.
See Michael Hill & Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century,
CSO ONLINE (July 16, 2021, 2:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html (designating Yahoo’s 2013 breach, which the company publicly announced three years later, as the biggest breach).
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record fines, 8 the seemingly endless parade of data breaches has generated
criticisms of the current regulatory system. Much of this criticism has been
directed towards the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 9 which claims the
title of “the nation’s primary privacy and data security enforcer.” 10 Indeed,
the FTC’s recent no-money settlement with Zoom involving allegedly poor
data security practices prompted one Commissioner to bemoan what he sees
as the FTC’s “ineffective” approach to data security. 11
Of course, simply observing that there are a large number of data
breaches is not necessarily evidence that something is wrong with the current
regulatory system. It is well known from the tort literature that when precautions are costly, accident-causing activity is beneficial, and ex-post remediation is cheap, the optimal number of accidents is not zero. 12 But when actors
do not fully internalize the external costs of their activity, the result is too
much activity and too many accidents. The quintessential example of the consequences of uninternalized spillover effects are firms that do not bear the full
costs of industrial pollution they generate when producing socially valuable
products like refined fuel or pesticides. 13 In such cases, the aim of enforcers
is not to deter activity altogether—foregoing all the value generated by these
products would impose too great a cost on society. Rather, efficient regulation
forces the firm to internalize the full external costs of their activity, thereby
fostering private incentives both to take optimal precautions against harm and
to produce at socially optimal levels. 14

8.
For example, the consumer reporting agency Equifax agreed to settle charges with a
variety of government agencies and the states for a $100 million civil penalty and at least $425
million dollars to help those affected by the data breach. See Equifax to Pay $575 Million as
Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (July 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifaxpay-575-million-part-settlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related.
9.
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2237–46 (2015).
10.
See FTC Releases 2018 Privacy and Data Security Update, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-releases-2018privacy-data-security-update.
11.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra at 2, Regarding Zoom Video
Communications, Inc., Matter No. 1923167 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/public_statements/1582914/final_commissioner_chopra_dissenting_statement_on_zoom.pdf.
12.
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178–79
(2004).
13.
Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 104 (2019) (using a data
pollution metaphor to argue that social intervention should focus on the external harms from
collection and misuse of personal data).
14.
Id. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 7
(1987); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987).
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The same principles apply to data security. 15 Because legitimate firms’
collection and use of consumer data benefit consumers, an optimal enforcement policy would not seek to eliminate the risk of harm from data breaches.16
Indeed, if it is sufficiently expensive to prevent data breaches, or sufficiently
easy to mitigate the losses from a breach and make identity theft victims
whole after a breach, the socially optimal level of breaches could be quite
high. To use a hyperbolic example, one could completely eliminate the risk
of financial account fraud by returning to an all-cash system. Clearly, the benefits of eliminating the staggering cost of credit card fraud would pale in comparison to the marginal cost of eliminating credit cards—which would include, for example, the large negative effects such a policy would have on
online commerce. Rather, an optimal enforcement policy aimed at minimizing the systemic costs of data breaches would focus on inducing firms to take
precautions against harmful breaches only as long as the marginal costs of
additional security measures are less than the marginal benefits from those
measures. 17 It is well-known that if firms take only cost-justified precautions,
the sum of breach and security costs is at a minimum. This is important, because if firms pass along these costs to consumers, the full price of the firm’s
product will be at its minimum, leading consumers to purchase the “correct”
amount of the product. Social welfare will be maximized.18
There is no reason to believe that the current enforcement regime approximates an optimal enforcement policy. In this Article we employ the lens of
the economics of accidents to explain why the current FTC approach to data
security is unlikely to lead firms to employ optimal data security. 19 Indeed,
our analysis shows that the FTC’s current approach to data security—with its
focus on the concept of “reasonableness” (both in liability and remedy) and
its almost complete inability to secure monetary relief—is unlikely to instill
anything close to optimal incentives for data holders. Since the early 2000s,
the FTC creatively employed its capacious statute to target shoddy data practices. It has challenged “unreasonable” security practices directly as “unfair”
and indirectly as “deceptive” if the firm broke an express or implied promise

15.
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 13, at 108–110.
16.
Id. at 135–36.
17.
See SHAVELL, supra note 12 at 21–26.
18.
Id. at 22–23.
19.
This article focuses on firms’ incentives and not on law enforcement strategies aimed
at those expending effort to cause breaches. For a discussion of these law enforcement strategies, see Ivan P. L. Png, Chen-Yu Wang & Qiu-Hong Wang, The Deterrent and Displacement
Effects of Information Security Enforcement: International Evidence, 25 J MGMT. INFO. SYS.
125 (2008). Additionally, the Appendix below discusses optimal mitigation strategies but does
not focus on the question of protective activity and expenditures by consumers. See Ye Hong
& William Neilson, Cybercrime and Punishment, 49 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2020), for an examination of the deterrence effect of punishing firms that are victims of data breaches.
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to take “reasonable” data security measures. 20 Although the FTC’s actions
were welcome at the time to fill a gap in enforcement as the Internet exploded,
after two decades, there are reasons to believe that the FTC’s current approach
has outlived its usefulness and is in serious need of updating. Importantly,
these shortcomings cannot be fixed through changes to the FTC enforcement
approach; they are largely generated by a mismatch between the tools that
Congress gave it over a century ago and what it needs today to foster efficient
care for consumers’ data. 21
The first problem is informational. As noted above, the FTC developed
an approach to data security revolving around the concept of “reasonable”
security measures. 22 Whether the FTC uses unfairness or deception to challenge a data practice, it must define the standard of data protection required
given the circumstances and articulate why the defendant’s practices fell
short. The FTC must perform the same task when enforcing its orders,
which—at least until recently—have generally required liable firms to implement reasonable precautions or face civil penalties for order violations. 23 The
ability of the FTC to identify both of these measures is likely to be fraught
with error, leading to both over- or under-deterrence depending on the size
and the bias of the error. The second problem is remedial. The primary harm
from data breaches is the increase in the risk of both direct costs and financial
harm resulting from identity theft and payment card fraud, and intangible
harms resulting from the compromise of potentially embarrassing personal
information. The FTC’s ability to make careless firms pay for this harm, however, is essentially non-existent. In the October term of 2020, the Supreme

20.
See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Grago, F.T.C. Matter No. 1723003, Docket No. C-4678
(June 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_3003_c4678_
clixsense_complaint_7-2-19.pdf (alleging that poor data security practices both violated promises made to customers regarding data security and were unreasonable). The FTC has also challenged as deceptive the failure to live up to promises to take specific security measures. See,
e.g., Complaint at 11, Zoom Video Commc’ns, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 1923167, Docket No.
C-4731 (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1923167zoomcomplaint_0.pdf (alleging failure to employ promised 256-bit end-to-end encryption).
21.
See generally James C. Cooper & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Equitable Monetary Relief
Under the FTC Act: An Opportunity for a Marginal Improvement, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 645
(2021) (explaining the economic incentives created by the FTC’s remedial powers); Ian M.
Davis, Resurrecting Magnuson-Moss Rulemaking: The FTC at a Data Security Crossroads, 69
EMORY L.J. 781 (2020) (discussing the FTC’s remedial powers associated with data security
cases).
22.
Failure to take “reasonable” security measures can be both an unfair and deceptive
practice to the extent that the firm made material representations. See infra notes 39–41 and
accompanying text.
23.
As discussed in more detail, infra, while the FTC can predicate liability on failure to
take reasonable security measures, the Eleventh Circuit decision in LabMD casts doubt on the
extent to which the FTC can design orders requiring defendants to employ “reasonable” security
measures. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2018). As
a result, post-LabMD order have become more specific. See infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
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Court held that the FTC Act does not allow the FTC to obtain equitable monetary relief for first-time violations. 24 This leaves only the administrative
path, which also limits the FTC to non-monetary injunctive relief. 25 The upshot is that in its current state, Section 5 of the FTC Act suffers from uncertain
liability standards and an inability to force firms to internalize the costs of
their data security decisions. Importantly, this state of affairs has implications
beyond FTC enforcement. Although the FTC Act does not provide a private
right of action, it is not an airtight compartment; private plaintiffs can rely on
the FTC’s reasonableness standard to make out claims related to data
breaches under state law. 26
We consider three possible approaches the FTC could take to ameliorate
the current situation: (1) a laissez-faire approach, where the FTC polices express deception, but relies on market forces to be the primary source of incentives for firms to supply data protection; (2) a negligence rule, which is
similar to the status quo, but would have firms pay for the harm they cause
when they fail to take reasonable care; and (3) a strict liability rule, that would
have firms pay for expected harm caused by a breach, regardless of the level
of care taken. A standard result in the economics of accidents literature is that
each of these approaches will lead firms to employ optimal security in a world
of perfect information. 27 In practice, however, given the limits on information
about both harm and cost of care, and the interdependent nature of security,
the real-world application of these standards are likely to lead to divergent
outcomes and differing rates of error. 28 We analyze the relative net benefits
of each approach, and identify several reasons why a strict liability regime is
likely to be superior to the current framework that revolves around the
24.
AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1347–52 (2021).
25.
The FTC can obtain civil penalties for subsequent violations of administrative orders
and can seek certain monetary remedies in federal court following a successfully litigated administrative case for conduct that a reasonable person would have known was “fraudulent or
dishonest.” See Cooper & Kobayashi, supra note 21, at 647.
26.
See, e.g., In re Equifax, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295,
1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2019). Plaintiffs also use the § 5 standard to make out claims under California’s Business and Professions Code § 17200. See, e.g., Complaint at 30, Rahman v. Marriot
Int’l, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-00654, 2021 WL 346421 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2020).
27.
See SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 9.
28.
This result and the analysis in this article generally are related to the economic literature on the choice of regulatory instrument in the presence of uncertainty. While the choice of
regulatory instruments (e.g., tradeable permits versus emissions taxes in environmental regulation, or the use of price versus quantity regulation of a natural monopolist) perform similarly
with perfect information, the relative performance will be dependent upon case-specific factors
under conditions of uncertainty. See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert
N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENV’T
L. REV. 313 (1998); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477
(1974). In the context of liability for data security, the relevant choice of regulatory instruments
is between definition measurement of what constitutes “reasonable security” under a negligence
/reasonable security approach, and the definition and measurement of ex-ante harm generated
by a data breach under a strict liability approach.
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concept of reasonableness. The benefits of strict liability flow primarily from
the likelihood that absent some sort of liability regime, firms will not fully
internalize the costs and benefits of their data security decisions, and the relatively large informational burdens associated with measuring actual and optimal care under a negligence regime that are likely to lead to enforcement
errors. 29
The time is ripe for this reform. Congress has been aflutter with various
privacy and data security proposals in response to recent data breaches and
privacy scandals, 30 and there is no sign that this appetite for reform will abate
with the new administration. 31 Indeed, a recent FTC settlement with Zoom
showcases the Democratic Commissioners’ frustration with what they see as
an impotent FTC. 32 Further, recent legal setbacks have raised serious questions about the FTC’s remedial authority: in addition to the Supreme Court
eliminating the FTC’s ability to obtain equitable monetary relief in federal
court in LabMD, the Eleventh Circuit casted serious doubt on the FTC’s ability to enforce its administrative orders dealing with data security. 33 Both of
these legal developments have renewed calls to give the FTC broader remedial authority, including the ability to obtain civil penalties. This ability could
be used to implement a strict liability regime that requires firms to pay for the
expected consumer harm from their breaches. 34

29.
The Antitrust Injury doctrine, set out in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), incorporates a similar approach that focuses on remedies and not the
substantive law to control incentives in private antitrust suits. See John E. Lopatka & William
H. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust Injury and the Evolution of Antitrust Law, 17 ANTITRUST
20, 24 (2002); William H Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to
Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980).
30.
See, e.g., Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3300, 116th Cong. (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3300; Consumer Data Privacy and
Security Act of 2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3456/text.
31.
Jedidiah Bracy, What Could a Biden Administration Mean for Privacy, Cybersecurity?, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-could-a-bidenadministration-mean-for-privacy-cybersecurity; Kristin L. Bryan et al., Election 2020: Looking
Forward to What a Biden Presidency May Mean for Data Privacy and Data Privacy Litigation,
NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/election-2020-lookingforward-to-what-biden-presidency-may-mean-data-privacy-and.
32.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, supra note 11.
33.
LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2018).
34.
It would be impossible for the FTC to operationalize a strict liability standard under
its current § 5 authority because (1) it lacks civil penalty authority for first violations; and (2) is
statutorily mandated to perform a cost-benefit analysis to find an act or practice unfair. See 15
U.S.C. § 45(n). At least one legislative proposal would impose strict liability. See, e.g., Data
Breach Prevention and Compensation Act of 2018, S. 2289, 115th Cong. (2018) (imposing strict
liability and federal notification requirements on credit reporting agencies for data breaches).
The bill provides civil penalties of $100 for each consumer whose name and at least one item
of personally identifying information was compromised, plus an additional $50 for each additional item of personally identifying information compromised for each consumer. Id. §
4(b)(2)(A).
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Finally, it is important to note that we are not the first to reach a similar
conclusion. Over a decade ago, drawing an analogy between the reservoir of
water in Rylands v. Fletcher and the reservoirs of data held by firms, Professor Danielle Citron argued that strict liability is preferable to negligence in
dealing with data breaches. 35 Although we reach a similar conclusion, our
analysis differs from hers in important ways, and makes several novel contributions. First, our proposal is not to expand liability under tort law doctrine,
but rather for a federal agency, such as the FTC, to act as the national regulator of data security with broad preemptive effect. 36 Second, the results backing our proposal derive from the rigorous application of the workhorse optimal care model, in which a firm responds to various liability rules by
minimizing the sum of precaution and liability costs. Applying a consistent
economic framework allows us to highlight the key informational advantages
of a strict liability approach centered on remedies that are based on the harm
caused by the breach. 37 In particular, we show how strict liability is likely to
be more robust to regulatory errors than a negligence-based standard. Finally,
we show why strict liability is superior to negligence for developing a vibrant
cyber insurance market in this informational environment, which will allow
data security regulation to be de facto outsourced to insurers who will contract
with firms for optimal levels of care. This facet of our analysis suggests that
to the extent that the informational advantages of strict liability make
35.
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007). Like we do, she
explains why negligence is unlikely to be up to the task because uncertain standards and enforcement can lead to over-deterrence. Id. at 263–64. Moreover, the failure of consumers to
appreciate the residual risk associated with even optimal levels of security will create incentives
for them to share too much data. Id. at 264–66. Further, she also suggests that strict liability
may have an advantage by spreading data breach costs across all consumers. Id. at 285–87. In
more recent work, Professor Solow-Niederman recognizes the shortcomings of privacy torts to
reach the harm from data breaches, and advocates for a tort based on a breach of duty of confidentiality. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J. 614 (2018). Recognizing that data breaches are
most likely a unilateral care situation because consumers are unlikely to have the ability to avoid
data breaches, she proposes a modified version of strict liability that would apply only to firms
that failed to follow a “well-instantiated security guideline or . . . established security standard.”
Id. at 631–32. Because imposition liability would still be based on the firm failing to comply
with a negligence-type established level of care, her approach is a negligence-based approach
that eliminates some of the traditional defenses to liability (e.g., the actions of third-party hackers as a superseding cause). Moreover, her analysis does not address hard to define and uncertain level of care standards discussed below and in Citron, supra note 35.
36.
Ben-Shahar also examines public law alternatives to private suits under tort law, including command and control data regulation, data taxes, as well as publicly enforced liability
for breach. Ben-Shahar, supra note 13, at 133–48. His analysis incorporates the use of harmbased sanctions for breached firms, but he does not analyze the relative benefits of using a strict
liability regime over a negligence-based regime. See id.
37.
Professor Citron’s analysis does not address the critical role of optimal harm-based
remedies play in moderating incentives in a strict liability system, or the feasibility of using
harm-based remedies in practice. See Citron, supra note 35.
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underwriting data breach risks easier, it will allow for the development of
private cyber insurance contracts that harness diffuse private information on
costs and benefits from precautions held by insurers that cover many entities.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II describes
the FTC’s current approach to data security. Part III applies a stylized version
of the “optimal precautions” model to the data security context, and Part IV
investigates whether the market alone can provide optimal levels of data security, answering the question in the negative. Part V presents the central
claim of our Article and analyzes the relative costs and benefits of a negligence regime (which approximates the FTC’s current approach), and a strict
liability approach, finding the latter to be superior. This part also explores
how a strict liability system is superior to one based on reasonableness to
foster a robust cyber insurance market, which would facilitate an even more
efficient use of information. Part VI discusses how a strict liability system
would be operationalized in practice, and Part VII concludes.

II. FTC’S CURRENT APPROACH TO DATA SECURITY
Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC broad authority to pursue firms
engaged in “unfair and deceptive acts or practices.” 38 As applied, the FTC’s
data security enforcement program has centered around the concept of reasonableness. As the FTC explained on the occasion of its fiftieth data security
settlement:
The touchstone of the [FTC]’s approach to data security is reasonableness: a company’s data security measures must be reasonable and
appropriate in light of the sensitivity and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and complexity of its business, and the cost
of available tools to improve security and reduce vulnerabilities. . . .
[T]he [FTC] has made clear that it does not require perfect security;
reasonable and appropriate security is a continuous process of assessing and addressing risks; there is no one-size-fits-all data security program; and the mere fact that a breach occurred does not mean
that a company has violated the law. 39
This standard comes directly from the FTC’s unfairness authority under Section 5, which condemns conduct that creates “substantial injury to consumers” that is not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition. 40 The

38.
39.

15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA SECURITY
SETTLEMENT (Jan. 31, 2014).
40.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n). Similarly, the Safeguards Rule under Graham-Leach-Bliley
(GLB) requires covered firms to take data security precautions that is appropriate given the
company’s size, complexity, and scope of business, as well as the sensitivity of the data at issue.
16 C.F.R § 314.3 (2022).
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FTC has used this approach to condemn practices that it alleges puts sensitive
data at substantial risk that could have been avoided at minimal cost. For example, in its case against TJX, which concerned a data breach involving
nearly several million payment card accounts, the FTC alleged that practices
such as storing and transmitting payment card information in plain text, failing to use firewalls, not requiring strong passwords for administrative logins,
or failing to employ standard measures to detect unauthorized network access
or patching software were unfair. 41
Importantly, the FTC does not require a breach to trigger the use of unfairness—shoddy security practices that raise the risk of harm will suffice.
For example, LabMD involved the inadvertent placement of sensitive medical information on a peer-to-peer network without any evidence that third
parties actually accessed the data. 42 More recently, the unfairness count in the
FTC’s settled complaint against Zoom alleged only that by circumventing
certain security measures in Safari, Zoom introduced potential vulnerabilities; it did not allege any unauthorized access of consumer data or authorized
viewing of Zoom meetings. 43
The FTC also brings data security cases based on deception. Some of
these cases involve breaches of specific promises, such as using certain types
of encryption. 44 The FTC will also import the notion of reasonableness into
deception when they allege that a company’s general commitments to protecting data gives rise to an implied claim that it will take reasonable care of
consumers’ data. 45 For example, in the recent case involving Support King’s
“stalkerware” app SpyFone, the FTC alleged that Support King’s promise to
“take all reasonable precautions to safeguard customer information” was deceptive because the defendant in fact “did not take all reasonable precautions

41.
Complaint, TJX Companies, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 0723055, Docket No. C-4227
(Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/08/080801tjxcomplaint.pdf.
42.
LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2018). The
only third-party known to have accessed the data was Tiversa, a data security firm that eventually reported its finding to the FTC when LabMD would not pay Tiversa for data security services. Id. This tip led to the case against LabMD, and subsequent Congressional hearings and
litigation involving possible impropriety. Id. at 1225 & n.7.
43.
See Complaint, Zoom Video Commc’ns, Inc., supra note 20, at 8–10.
44.
See, e.g., id. at 11–12; Complaint at 6, Credit Karma, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 132
3091, Docket No. C-4480 (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/1408creditkarmacmpt.pdf.
45.
See, e.g., Complaint at 5, Credit Karma, Inc., supra note 44; Complaint at 6, Uber
Techs., Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 152 3054, Docket No. C-4662 (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/152_3054_c-4662_uber_technologies_revised_complaint.pdf.
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to safeguard customer information and information stored in Respondent’s
database was not encrypted.” 46
What emerges from the FTC’s history of data security enforcement is a
negligence-like reasonable security standard, but one without clear guidance
of what satisfies the standard. 47 All but three of the FTC’s data security cases
have settled, and only one of the litigated cases has required a judicial determination of whether a firm’s data security practices were unreasonably lax. 48
Because the security practices challenged by the FTC have almost exclusively
been far below a reasonableness standard, 49 the complaint allegations in settlement documents provide only information about what very poor security
practices look like—that is, the cases provide a lot of information about what
type of practices the FTC will consider unreasonable, but very little about
what type of practices might satisfy a reasonableness standard. To fill this
gap, the FTC has publicized some closing letters, and more recently has provided guidance concerning practices that are likely to meet a reasonableness
standard in publications like Start with Security and Stick with Security.50

46.
Complaint at 4, 6, Support King, LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 1923003, Docket No. C4756 (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1923003c4756spy
fonecomplaint_0.pdf.
47.
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
48.
The only litigated cases are Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir.
2015); LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018); and Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. D-Link Sys. Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00039, 2017 WL 65168 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017) (settled in 2019). In LabMD, the administrative law judge did not find the FTC had showed a likelihood of substantial consumer injury, so did not reach the reasonableness of LabMD’s practices. Initial Decision at 82–87, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 1023099, Docket. No. C-9357
(Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/151113labmd_decision.pdf. The FTC, however, overturned this decision, and held that LabMD’s practices were
unreasonable. Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 1023099, Docket.
No. C-9357 (July 29, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmdopinion.pdf.
49.
FTC data security cases have been referred to as “low hanging fruit,” and include
challenging practices like giving never changing default passwords for networks that store
credit cards or transmitting sensitive information over unsecure networks in plain text. See, e.g.,
Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240–41; Complaint at 2, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No.
0423160, Docket No. C-4148 (Sept. 20, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/cases/2005/09/092305comp0423160.pdf; Complaint at 2, TJX Cos., Inc., F.T.C.
Matter No. 0723055, Docket No. C-4227 (July 29, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/cases/2008/08/080801tjxcomplaint.pdf.
50.
See, e.g., Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Priv. and Identity Prot.,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Dana Rosenfeld, Kelley Drye (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/closing_letters/verizon-communications-inc./141112verizonclosingletter.pdf; Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Priv. and Identity Prot.,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Reed Freeman, Morrison & Foerster LLP (Mar. 12, 2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/netflix-inc./100312netflixletter.pdf; Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Priv. and Identity Prot., Fed. Trade
Comm’n, to Lisa J. Sotto, Hunton & Williams LLP (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/nid/150810morganstanleycltr.pdf.

May 2022]

Unreasonable

269

Nonetheless, the FTC’s data security “jurisprudence” does not provide the
same type of information to potential injurers as common law negligence,
where a myriad of judicial decisions map out the line between reasonable and
unreasonable conduct.
If the current FTC approach to data security is akin to negligence, it
comes with an important caveat that severely hinders its ability to effect optimal deterrence. In tort law, a plaintiff can recover damages when the defendant’s unreasonable conduct proximately caused the harm. 51 It is the threat
of having to pay for the harm caused by unreasonable conduct that forces
internalization of the externality and provides incentives for defendants to
take reasonable care. Although Section 5 unfairness and deception claims related to promises to take “reasonable care” mimic the negligence standard
under tort law, the FTC cannot force this needed internalization because it is
unable to secure monetary relief for the harm caused by unreasonable data
security practices.
Almost all of the FTC’s data security cases have been brought as administrative complaints. 52 If the defendant does not settle with the FTC, staff will
litigate the case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), with the decision
appealable to the full Commission and ultimately a federal appellate court. 53
In administrative litigation, the FTC can obtain injunctive relief, including
orders that prohibit a defendant from continuing to engage in conduct that
violates the FTC Act, as well as reporting requirements, and “fencing-in” relief that prohibits the defendant from engaging in conduct that does not violate Section 5, but nonetheless may help deter future violations. 54 In the context of data security, the FTC typically obtains a mandatory injunction, which
until 2018, essentially required defendants to maintain reasonable security. 55
However, in LabMD, the Eleventh Circuit held that orders requiring a defendant “to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness” were vague, and
thus unenforceable. 56 This has led the FTC to craft more specific process requirements in its data security orders.57

51.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
52.
See supra note 48.
53.
15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
54.
Id.
55.
For example, the order in LabMD was typical, requiring defendant to “establish and
implement, and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information
collected from or about consumers.” Final Order at 2, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Matter No. 1023099,
Docket No. 9357 (July 28, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/160729labmdorder.pdf.
56.
LabMd, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018).
57.
See, e.g., Decision & Order, Grago, F.T.C. Matter No. 1723003, Docket No. C-4678
(June 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_3003_clixsense_
decision_and_order_7-2-19.pdf. For example, the FTC order requires the defendant to implement an “information security program . . . designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and
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The FTC can collect substantial civil penalties (over $40,000 per violation) for violations of administrative orders. 58 Further, although the FTC Act
allows the FTC to obtain a monetary judgment in federal court following an
administrative proceeding, this power could almost certainly never be used in
a data security case. Section 19 allows the FTC to obtain monetary relief in
federal court against parties who have lost in administrative litigation, subject
to the limitation that a reasonable person would have known that the conduct
at issue was “dishonest or fraudulent.” 59 Thus, for this avenue to be available
to the FTC, it must litigate and win an administrative case, and more importantly, the security lapses must be so extreme that they could be characterized as something a reasonable person would have known was “dishonest”
or “fraudulent.” 60 These high hurdles have limited the FTC’s use of Section
19 to twice in the past 30 years, and make it even more unlikely that it would
be a feasible strategy in the data security context. 61
Another obstacle to the FTC’s ability to effectively deter unreasonable
data practices is that the Supreme Court has held that Section 13(b) of FTC
Act does not allow the FTC to obtain monetary relief in federal court. 62 Although there are various proposals in Congress to restore the FTC’s power, 63
it is important to note that even before AMG, the FTC was only able to obtain
remedies such as disgorgement or restitution, which typically are limited to
some measure of revenue obtained from consumers for the product or service
under scrutiny. 64 Importantly, these equitable remedies do not cover harm to
consumers that did not contract directly with the firm (as typically would be
the case for harm caused by a breach at a credit reporting agency or data broker) or consequential damages that arise when third parties misuse breached
integrity” of consumer’s personal information, and mandates, focusing on processes like assessments, monitoring, and identifying responsible employees. Id. at 3.
58.
15 U.S.C. § 45(b). The maximum civil penalty amount has increased from $43,792
to $46,517 for violations of §§ 5(l), 5(m)(1)(A), and 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act, 7A(g)(l) of the
Clayton Act and § 525(b) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. See Adjustments to Civil
Penalty Amounts, 87 Fed. Reg. 1070 (2022).
59.
15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2). In such an action, the FTC can obtain “rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, the payment of damages.” Id.
§ 57b(b).
60.
The FTC could settle a § 19 case for monetary relief if it had a credible threat to bring
and win an administrative case and the conduct at issue was dishonest or fraudulent.
61.
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993); Stipulation of Settlement & Final Order, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Telebrands Corp., Case 2:07-cv03525-JAG-MCA (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/cases/2009/01/090114finalorder.pdf.
62.
AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1347–52 (2021).
63.
See, e.g., Consumer Protection and Recovery Act, H.R. 2668, 117th Congress (20212022) (authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to seek monetary relief in federal court
from businesses that engage in unlawful commercial practices such as false advertising, consumer fraud, and anticompetitive conduct).
64.
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Com. Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2016). See
generally Cooper & Kobayashi, supra note 21, at 645–48, 652–58.

May 2022]

Unreasonable

271

consumer data, such as fraudulent credit card charges or ID theft. 65 That is,
the harm from the typical data breach is not likely to be remedied by disgorgement or restitution because the harm flows from third-parties stealing
and misusing consumer data, not from the breached firm tricking consumers
into buying something. As can readily be seen, the FTC’s remedial powers
are sorely lacking the ability to deter unreasonable data practices. The FTC’s
injunctive relief requiring certain data security practices is unlikely to mimic
efficient care, and moreover applies only to the firm under order. Further,
while injunctive relief the FTC can obtain probably places non-trivial burdens
on some firms—especially if it requires major changes in business model—
these burdens are unlikely to correlate in any meaningful way with consumer
harm, which is a necessary condition to force firms to internalize the expected
harm their data security practices cause. Finally, monetary remedies are available only when the defendant was engaged in “dishonest or fraudulent” conduct, which is unlikely in most data breach cases surrounding negligence. In
sum, the FTC’s current remedial authority are unlikely to provide any meaningful incentives for firms to invest efficiently in data security. 66

III. THE BASIC MODEL
An economic approach to optimal enforcement regimes seeks to minimize the total social costs associated with data breach. These costs include
both the harm from exposure of personal data and the cost of increased data
security investments designed to reduce the likelihood of a breach, or to mitigate the level of consumer harm in the event of breach. While data breaches
generate increased costs for consumers through new and existing account
fraud, medical identity theft, and the exposure of sensitive information, they
also induce increased investments in data security. For example, compliance

65.
For example, the only viable monetary theory in the FTC’s complaint accompanying
the $575 million global settlement between Equifax and the FTC, CFPB, and the states was
deception related to the security provided to consumers and small businesses who purchased
Equifax services (such as credit scores or credit monitoring). Complaint for Permanent Injunctive & Other Relief at 15–17, 19–21, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Equifax Inc., No. 1:19-mi-99999UNA (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/172_3203_equifax_complaint_7-22-19.pdf. Had the FTC been the only agency involved in the
settlement, equitable monetary relief under 13(b) would have only allowed the FTC to seek
restitution for consumers and business who were deceived into purchasing these services, a
miniscule sum in comparison to the core harm that came from the breach of hundreds of millions
of records. It is possible that the FTC could have also pursued civil penalties for a “knowing”
violation of the safeguards rule. See id. at 14 (alleging that Equifax had “awareness and actual
knowledge” of its data security failures, which allegedly violated the Safeguards Rule). The
FTC Act provides for actions in federal district court for civil penalties for a rule violation if
the defendant has “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive is prohibited by such rule.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(m)(1)(A).
66.
See Cooper & Kobayashi, supra note 21 at 647.
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with NIST data security standards would require firms to encrypt their data,
conduct assessments, and to hire third-party assessors and a chief information
officer. 67 In its “Start with Security” business guide, moreover, the FTC recommends that businesses take steps that include guarding networks against
various types of attacks, limiting the extent to which firms collect and store
sensitive information, using strong cryptology to store and transmit confidential information, segmenting networks, monitoring network traffic, and verifying that service providers use reasonable security. 68
Although these measures clearly make data more secure and reduce the
harm from any breach that occurs, they can also generate significant costs.
These costs are not limited to just direct expenditures on data security, but
also to the informational costs associated with attempting to anticipate threats
ex-ante. Further, to the extent that additional security and the reduced collection of sensitive data diminishes customer experience (for example, having to
logon with two-factor authentication or having to change passwords frequently), increased data security can reduce product demand. Thus, from a
social standpoint, the goal should not be to achieve perfect or even maximal
security, but rather to foster incentives for firms to minimize the sum of
breach and security costs. What is more, an important byproduct of minimizing total social costs is that firms will produce at the lowest possible cost, thus
maximizing the consumer and producer surplus created when they sell their
products. In Figure 1, we use a stylized version of the workhorse optimal
precautions model from the law and economics literature to illustrate this
problem. Security expenditures, s, are measured on the horizontal axis, and
reduce the probability of a breach—which we define as ߖ(s)—causing consumer harm, h. At the same time, security costs, c(s), increase as s increases.
The total expected social cost associated with any level of security, TSC(s),
is the sum of c(s) and ߖ(s) h. 69
67.
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
(2018),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP
/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf.
68.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY, A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM FTC CASES (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plainlanguage/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf.
69.
The model in the Appendix also allows for firms to take actions that serve to mitigate
the harm when a breach occurs. Ex-post mitigation expenditures, m, decrease the per record
harm h(m), but come at a cost of e(m), and optimal mitigation occurs when the marginal benefit
of such expenditures equals the marginal cost of such expenditures. The marginal benefit of an
increase in mitigation expenditures m is the reduction in harm conditional upon a breach -h’
(m). The marginal cost of such expenditures is e’(m). Thus, the optimal level of mitigation expenditures m* occurs where -h’ (m) = e’(m). In contrast to security expenditures, which are
incurred ex-ante regardless of whether or not a breach occurs, mitigation expenditures have the
advantage of only being incurred with probability ߖ(s) when a breach occurs. Further, because
ex-ante prevention (s) and ex-post mitigation (m) expenditures are substitutes, increases in mitigation will reduce the optimal level of security expenditures by reducing the harm associated
with a breach. Note that although security expenditures are a function of expected mitigation
expenditures, mitigation expenditures are conditional on a given level of security expenditures
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Total social cost is at its minimum at s*, which as we show in the Appendix, coincides with the level of security where marginal benefit from additional security (in terms of reduced probability of a breach) is equal to its
marginal cost. 70 Note that from a social perspective, we do not want harm
driven to zero if security is costly. Optimal security does not occur when all
breaches are deterred, but instead occurs at s* when there are no more costeffective—in the sense that marginal benefit is less than marginal cost—security measures to be taken.
FIGURE 1
OPTIMAL DATA SECURITY
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Until this point, we have focused only on incentives to invest in data security for a given level of data collection. But even if a firm takes optimal care
of the data it collects, it can still reduce expected data breach harms by limiting how much data it collects in the first place. Even if Home Depot and a
local hardware store collect the same data from customers and employ the
same security procedures, a breach at Home Depot affects a greater number
of customers and is more costly to society than a breach at a local hardware
store. As with decisions regarding care, decisions regarding collection involve weighing the marginal costs and benefits of additional data collection.
Broadly, firms end up collecting data through two channels. First, data collection can be the artifact of a product market transaction (e.g., payment card
and other sensitive information transmitted to a merchant with the purchase
of a smart phone). Second, data is often itself the purpose of the transaction,
as is the case when online platforms provide content and services for free and
employ the information about their users to generate advertising revenue. In
because mitigation is triggered only when a breach has already occurred. It can be shown that
డௌ כ
ିథᇱௗு כ
= ᇲᇲ ᇲᇲ  < כ0, where H*m* is the change in minimized net harm with respect to
డ

 ାథ ௗ[ା]

changes in the optimal level of mitigation expenditures.
70.
We illustrate this condition in the Appendix.
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either case, allocative efficiency requires that the marginal value of consumer
data collected equals the marginal cost of acquiring it, securing it, and the
expected harm from a breach given the firm’s level of security.
To illustrate this problem, Figure 2 depicts the firm’s derived demand for
data (labelled VMP(d)), which is the marginal value of additional data collected. 71 As noted above, data can provide direct value to a firm through use
in targeted advertising or increased quality of the product due to customization, or simply because it is a necessary input to facilitate a product market
transaction. 72 The Figure also illustrates the marginal social costs of data collection, storage and use. From a social perspective, these costs not only include the direct marginal costs of acquiring and maintaining the information
(labeled ߱Ԣ(݀) in Figure 2), but also the expected breach costs per additional
unit of data collected (H(s*) = ߖ(s*)*h). 73 Thus, from a social perspective,
the allocatively efficient level of data collection is d*, which is less than the
data collected if firms focused only on their private costs (d’). 74

71.
For a firm in a competitive output market, the derived demand for data will equal to
the Value of the Marginal Product (VMP) of data. For single pricing firms facing a downward
sloping supply curve in the output market, the derived demand for an input will equal the Marginal Revenue Product of the input. We use this scenario to derive results in the Appendix.
72.
The amount of data collected will not be a function of firm output unless consumers
always purchase a given quantity. For example, a consumer who purchases one gallon or thirty
gallons of gasoline, or one item or a cart full of items at the grocery store, will provide the same
information to the seller and the credit card network.
73.
The standard model of optimal precautions treats accident avoidance costs as occurring per-unit of activity (e.g., mile driven) or output (e.g., cars off an assembly line). See, e.g.,
SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 194–95, 195 n.29. We think in the data security context it makes
more sense to treat security costs, c(s*), as fixed for a given scale. For example, once a firm
chooses expenditures on encryption levels and employee training, they apply to all of the data
processed. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the marginal precaution cost per unit
of data collected is zero and does not affect any of our conclusions.
74.
With s = s*, per data unit expected breach costs H(s*) = ߖ(s*) h(s*) and the marginal
social cost of data collection equals ߱Ԣ(݀) + ߖ(s*) h. In the Appendix, we consider a more
general model that allows the firm to engage in post-breach mitigation expenditures to reduce
harm.
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FIGURE 2
OPTIMAL DATA COLLECTION
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The analysis above assumes that the harms generated by a data breach
are specific to the firm. However, many security harms exhibit interdependence, and the interdependent versus independent nature of firms’ security
choices can have an impact on the incentives to take care. 75 Examples of such
interdependencies include instances where there are multiple entry points that
need to be secured. For example, in the IOT context, an insecure camera connected to a secure wireless router and other secure devices on the network can
provide the weak link that compromises the security of the entire network.
Similarly, one merchant can become the victim of a credential stuffing attack
when lax security at another site leads to the breach of login credentials. A
third example is a setting where multiple sites hold the same data, so that a
breach of one site is equivalent to a breach of multiple sites. 76
Under these conditions, we show (in the Appendix) that interdependence
reduces the optimal security level to s** < s*. 77 The possibility that the common harm is caused by a breach at some other site acts as a “contagion tax”
that reduces the incremental value of marginal expenditures aimed at a protecting any individual site. 78 In general, a data security breach likely includes
both data held in common with other firms, as well as data held only by the
breached firm. This implies that the socially optimal amount of data security
is likely to lie somewhere between s** and s*.

75.
See Howard Kunreuther & Geoffrey Heal, Interdependent Security, 26 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 231 (2003).
76.
An example of largely overlapping data would be the credit reporting data held by
the three credit reporting agencies.
77.
See Appendix, equation (12) and subsequent text.
78.
Id.
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IV. CAN THE MARKET SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
In this Part, we examine whether market forces are likely to create incentives for data holders to mimic the socially efficient level of care. We find
that the informational assumptions required for the market to lead to optimal
care and activity levels are not likely to materialize because consumers often
have difficulties tracing causation and verifying firms’ data security claims.
This conclusion leads to our discussion in Part V of negligence-based and
strict liability rules.
In a world without liability for data breaches, the firm faces no legal compulsion to internalize the harm its data security practices caused. This, however, does not imply that firms face no consequences resulting from breaches
or that they will choose to have lax data security. In particular, if consumers
appreciate the potential harm associated with a firm’s practices and force
firms fully internalize the cost of these harms, firms will have optimal incentives to take care even if there is no legal compulsion to do so.
To see why, consider a setting in which consumers costlessly can determine a firm’s level of security and the expected harm associated with that
level of security (i.e., consumers know the value of H(s)). Assume further,
for simplicity, that the firm exists in a competitive industry (so that prices are
always equal to marginal cost in equilibrium) and that the only marginal costs
are those associated with data security and expected data breach harms. Suppose a firm adopts a less than optimal level of data security so < s*. With full
information, consumers will recognize that when they share their personal
data with this firm, they will suffer the per unit expected harm associated with
less than optimal care H(so) > H(s*). Ceteris paribus, consumers will perceive
a higher real price equal to the nominal price P plus the higher security costs
H(so). In contrast, a firm with the same nominal price P that adopts an optimal
security level will have a lower real price P + H(s*) < P + H(s0). 79 Put another
way, the extra security expenditures (from so to s*) make the firm better off,
as the marginal benefits to the firm from lower expected consumer harm (in
terms of increased demand for its product) exceed the marginal costs of these
additional security expenditures. 80 In this manner, perfect information among
consumers can force firms to internalize fully expected breach costs, leading
to the optimal security and data collection levels illustrated in Figures 1 and
2.
79.
This is equivalent to consumers reducing the value placed on the firm’s product by
H(so) - H(s*). Equivalently, if firms pay a price equal to expected harm to consumers for data,
taking less than optimal security will result in higher data acquisition costs (H(s*)) < (H(so)),
again making the firm uncompetitive.
80.
Notice that optimal security decisions also lead to optimal levels of output. Any other
value of s other than s* will lead to lower profits because either revenue will be too low (so < s*
Æ(H(so)) < (H(s*), causing the effective price to be above profit maximizing levels), or per unit
costs will be too high (so > s* Æ c(so) > c(s*)). This follows directly from the definition of d*
and s*.
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Note that this logic holds even if the profit-maximizing nominal price for
the firm’s product is zero (e.g., a search engine or a social media platform).
In this scenario, just as in the positive-price market discussed above, where
consumers have perfect information, the effective price to consumers is the
potential harm consumers may incur from sharing data, H(s). A platform
could skimp on security by choosing a level less than s*, but it will no longer
be maximizing profits: just as in the case with a fully transparent nominal
price discussed above, the loss in revenue associated with the effective price
increase from the cost-minimizing competitive level (H(s*)) to (H(so)) will be
greater than the security cost savings associated with moving from c(s*) to
c(so). 81
There are, however, reasons to believe that consumers may lack sufficient information to hold firms accountable for their lax data security practices in the marketplace. For example, a consumer providing their credit card
information to an online vendor is unlikely to know much about the company’s data security practices, or if they did, how these practices impact the
likelihood of suffering some type of identity theft. 82 What’s more, in a world
awash with personal data, when a consumer suffers a fraudulent charge on
their credit card, they will never know with certainty whether the thief obtained the account information from a recent high-profile breach or from
something more mundane, such as a skimmer used at a local gas station. 83
Relatedly, in some cases, the consumer may not be a customer of the firm
holding the data. For example, ad networks, credit reporting agencies, and
data brokers all collect consumer data, but in many cases do not sell their
services to consumers. Accordingly, their customers—businesses who use
these data—will not alter their demand for data based on data security practices. In these contexts, price fails to mediate security and output choices like
it would for firms that are consumer-facing.
Further, under current tort law principles, consumers may not be able to
recover the full harms caused by a breach. For example, consumers may not
be able to show standing to sue in federal court if harms have yet to materialize, and harmed consumers may find it difficult to prove specific causation

81.
For example, suppose that low security costs $5 and leads to $10 in expected harm,
while high security costs $7 and leads to $6 in expected harm. If the platform chose low security,
it would result in a cost savings of $2, but a reduction in consumer demand of $4 compared to
high security. Thus, the platform’s profits per unit of data would be $2 lower for choosing low
security. Joe Farrell makes a similar point with respect to firm’s choice of privacy policies. See
Joseph Farrell, Can Privacy Be Just Another Good?, 10 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 251,
253–56 (2012).
82.
Firms also have weak incentives to reveal information about attributes that make
their product more attractive than those offered by rival firms.
83.
On the other hand, some non-financial harms (e.g., a breach involving health information) are likely to be traceable because the data are usually stored by one firm that has had
an identifiable breach, and the harm occurs only when one becomes aware that the data are
exposed.
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in cases where their personal information was exposed in multiple breaches. 84
Another potential bar to recovery is the economic loss rule, which prevents
consumers from suing for economic losses caused by the negligent performance of a contract. 85 Thus, a consumer who is the victim of a data breach
would be left only with contractual remedies, which are very unlikely to cover
consequential damages caused by unauthorized third-party access to data
stored by the firm. 86 Finally, harmed consumers may find it difficult to prove
specific causation in cases where their personal information was put at risk in
multiple breaches.
When markets do not force firms to internalize the expected costs of data
breaches fully, legal intervention has the potential to better align private and
social incentives to provide security. As we demonstrate below, the alignment
of private and social incentives for investments in security could be achieved
by an ideal negligence system. In such a system, the optimal level of security
for each firm is clearly defined and perfectly enforced and is coupled with
deterring sanctions of sufficient size to force firms to comply with the legal
standard. However, the current form of FTC intervention—a negligence
standard with an ambiguously-defined standard of care and an inability to
make firms pay for consumer harm in most circumstances—is far from ideal
and is thus unlikely to align private and social incentives. As we show below,
the level of security that results from the FTC’s current approach is unclear:
moderate levels of uncertainty over the level of security needed to satisfy
Section 5 can lead to overinvestment, while high levels of uncertainty over
the legal standard, coupled with decisions that tend to map out only a lower
bound for data security practices, could lead to under investment. Moreover,
even if the standard is relatively clear, heterogeneity across firms with respect
to the costs and benefits of data security may lead to both over- and underdeterrence unless the standard is tailored to each firm’s unique circumstances. 87 Further complicating matters is the fact that the FTC is limited to
84.
See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk & Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 TEXAS L. REV. 737, 739–44 (2018).
85.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §3 (AM. L. INST. 2020).
86.
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss
Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 362–65 (2017).
87.
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the
Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. 249, 256 n.16 (2011). In situations where
harm and precaution costs are not likely to vary across firms, and regulators may have superior
incentives to collect information about risks, ex-ante regulation may be more efficient. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 360 (1984)
(“In certain contexts information about risk will not be an obvious by-product of engaging in
risky activities but rather will require effort to develop or special expertise to evaluate.”); see
also Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1731, 1756 (2015)
(arguing that the deadweight loss due to over- and under-deterrence caused by ex-ante regulation can be ameliorated if agencies can create more discrete regulatory categories); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust and Ex-Ante Sector Regulation, in THE GLOBAL
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 865 (2020) (noting the use of both
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equitable remedies, which as a practical matter means that non-compliance
penalties will not track consumer harm. The upshot is a liability regime that
is unlikely to provide anything even approximating optimal incentives.

V. REASONABLE SECURITY VERSUS STRICT LIABILITY
In this Part, we lay out the economic case for our central claim—that
holding firms strictly liable for data breaches would represent an improvement over the FTC’s current negligence-like regime. As shown above, in
cases where firms do not internalize the full social cost of the harms from data
breaches, there is a misalignment of the private and social incentives to provide data security. This misalignment provides a rationale for legal intervention to improve incentives for firms to make optimal security and output
choices.
The analysis below considers two ex-post liability regimes. 88 The first is
a negligence regime that imposes liability on breached firms with levels of
security that are lower than a threshold level of security. This approach is
similar to the FTC’s current use of unfairness to challenge “unreasonable”
data security practices (or deception to challenge broken promises to take
“reasonable” security). For example, the FTC could set a standard for data
security and levy penalties on companies for non-compliance that caused, or
increased the risk of, harm. This approach would require the FTC to set the
standard and assess the firm’s level of care relative to a standard of care after
it observes some triggering event that is likely to cause consumer harm. A
second ex-post enforcement approach would have the FTC observe an event
that causes consumer harm (e.g., a breach), assess the magnitude of the harm,
and penalize the breached firm an amount equal to the harm. Akin to a strict
liability rule, this approach requires firms to pay a fine equal to the consumer
harm caused by a breach regardless of the level of care taken.
We show that the root of the problem with the current negligence-like
regime administered by the FTC is informational: firms are in a better position than the FTC to weigh the marginal costs and benefits of taking additional data security precautions. A strict liability approach, in which the FTC
penalizes firms an amount equal to actual or expected consumer harm associated with a breach, would harness firms’ private information to make these
tradeoffs. This standard would require the FTC either to identify actual harm

approaches under the antitrust laws). But see Ben-Shahar, supra note 13, at 133–38 (analyzing
the problems with the use of ex-ante regulation in the context of data security).
88.
In theory, a negligence regime could operate through either ex-ante regulation where
the trigger is the discovery of a level of security that falls below the standard irrespective of
whether harm has occurred, rather than an ex-post enforcement regime where the firm is liable
only when there is triggering event that causes, or is likely to cause, consumer injury. For reasons discussed above, this Article focuses on ex-post enforcement with a triggering event being
an observed breach.
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traceable to defendant’s breach, or to estimate the ex-ante expected harm
from the breach. Importantly, the informational requirements for estimating
the expected harm from an actual event are likely far lower than those needed
to estimate actual and optimal care for idiosyncratic firms. Further, we show
that firms’ data security decisions are less sensitive to errors in estimating
damages than errors in estimating standards of care. Another benefit of a strict
liability approach is that by forcing firms to internalize harm associated with
data security practices, it will lead to optimal activity levels as well because
expected consumer harm will be built into the price of their good or service. 89
Thus, forcing firms to internalize the harm they cause—rather than forcing
them to comply with an estimated standard—is likely to lead to outcomes that
align more closely with the social ideal.

A. Ideal Negligence
In an ideal negligence regime, the threshold level of security for liability
is s*, as derived in Part III. 90 A negligence regime leads firms to comply with
the liability standard by creating a discontinuity in expected liability payments at the standard of care needed to be found non-negligent, here assumed
to be s*. Figure 3 illustrates the incentives of the firm when the fine imposed
on negligent firms equals harm. The firm is liable for expected harm H(s) and
incurs security costs (c(s)) at security levels s < s*. Once the firm reaches s*,
however, it is no longer liable for the harm it causes, and pays only its cost of
security (c(s)). Clearly, the optimal strategy for the firm is to avoid liability
by setting its security expenditures level s = s*, resulting in total costs equal
to c(s*).

89.
In the context of free advertising-supported services, firms could adjust quantity levels by, for example, collecting less data, or less sensitive data.
90.
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947), Judge Hand
suggests the following formulation for liability in the context of damages caused by a barge
breaking away from its moorings:
[T]he owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries
is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the
gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.
Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.
Id. at 173. Economists use a modified marginal version of the Hand Formula where there is
negligence if the marginal burden of an untaken precaution is less than the reduction in expected
loss, or ȟB < ȟpL. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85–87 (1987). In terms of the model presented in the Appendix, ȟB
= c’(s), ȟp = ߖ’(s) and L = d [h(m) + e(m)]. See also Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989) (discussing the economic interpretation of the Hand Formula).
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FIGURE 3
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD WITH FULL INFORMATION
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A major advantage of an ideal negligence system is that the incentives
generated are not sensitive to the magnitude of the remedy imposed on firms
that fail to have reasonable security. To the contrary, there is a wide range of
penalties that will provide firms with incentives to invest optimally in security
as long as the liability standard is correctly specified. 91 For example, as shown
in Figure 3, sanctions equal to twice and half harm incentivize the firm to take
optimal care because they preserve the discontinuity at s*. 92 Thus, an agency
implementing an ideal negligence regime does not have to expend resources
estimating harm accurately because the goal is not to set a price equal to external harm, but rather to deter non-compliance with the optimal standard
with sanctions of sufficient size.
It is important to note, however, that even ideal negligence regimes fail
to produce the correct incentives for firms to acquire and use data. 93 If a firm
makes optimal security investments, it will not have to pay for the harm that
results at s* (H(s*)). Thus, the firm’s cost of acquiring and using data will not
include the expected harm from data breach. If consumers do not appreciate
this residual harm, the ideal negligence system will not correct for this type
of misperception, and as explained in Part III, firms will have incentives to
collect and use socially excessive amounts of data.

91.
See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1529 (1984).
92.
At some point, however, if expected penalties fall too much it becomes rational for
the firm to choose the level of security that minimizes security costs plus the expected fine. Id.
at 1530–31; see also Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
93.
See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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B. Negligence with Costly Information
Until now, we have assumed that a regulatory agency is able to costlessly
set the standard of care at s* and costlessly assess firms’ levels of care. Because implementing an ideal negligence approach requires the accurate estimation of both s* and the level of care taken by the defendant, s i , informational limitations are likely to cause regulators to be imprecise in their
assessment of liability. For example, firms vary greatly with respect to the
factors that affect the optimal level of data security. A large hospital that collects reams of highly sensitive consumer data is likely to have both lower
costs to implementing security and higher levels of potential harms. By contrast, a minor website that collects relatively small amounts of mostly login
information poses a much lower level of harm and likely would have a more
difficult time than a large content provider implementing state of the art security. Because optimal security investments differ greatly between these
firms, the legally required level of compliance (s*) should vary as well. 94
However, making such fine distinctions between firms requires a great
deal of information and analysis. Further complicating matters is that data
security is not one-dimensional: firms can employ various means to protect
data that are both complements and substitutes. For example, in the payment
card context, fraud detection algorithms and network authentication are substitutes for point-of-sale authentication methods, such as signatures and
PINs. 95 The practical complexity of determining the optimal level of security
and the actual level of security a firm takes means that an agency’s assessment
of liability is likely to be error-prone.
Errors that are biased in one direction—systematically setting the standard too high or too low—will cause firms to invest either too much or too
little security, respectively. In addition to clear, yet erroneous standards, informational problems can lead to stochastic enforcement decisions. That is,
because the enforcement standard is a probability distribution rather than a
fixed point, investing in security below s* will not always result in liability,
and investing in security at or above s* can sometimes result in liability.
When liability is stochastic, firms take security measures based on expected
liability. 96 Importantly, even if the agency is unbiased—that is, correct on
average—in its assessment of the actual levels of security firms adopt and
optimal levels of security (s i , and s*, respectively), firms will still lack
94.
Id. at 22–23.
95.
See James C. Cooper & Todd J. Zywicki, A Chip Off the Old Block or a New Direction for Payment Card Security? The Law and Economics of the U.S. Transition to EMV, 2018
MICH. ST. L. REV. 869, 906 (2018).
96.
More formally, when considering security expenditures, the firm will now minimize
C(si) + [1-F(si)]H(si) where F(si) is the likelihood of escaping liability when investing in security
level si. With errors in assessing compliance with the standard, a wide range of security levels
(depending on the variance of F(si)) carry some positive probability of liability, with F(s) close
to 0 for low security levels and F(s) close to 1 for high security levels.
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incentives to take optimal care. This result occurs because even though the
errors are symmetric, the impact of these errors on expected liability costs are
not. 97
Figures 4A and 4B illustrate this result. Note that with stochastic liability,
the discontinuity at s* generated by an ideal negligence regime disappears
and is replaced by a line connecting the tails of the distribution of the agency’s
estimate of s*. This is due to the fact that now there is no single level of
security that will always absolve the firm of liability for harm from data
breaches. In Figure 4A, firms minimizing the sum of expected accident and
avoidance costs in the face of uncertainty now choose sU > s*. This overdeterrence result will hold as long as the variance in the regulator’s assessment of
liability is not too large, or precaution costs do not rise too quickly. 98 If the
variance is large, or when costs rise quickly, firms rationally underinvest in
security, as the benefits in terms of reducing the likelihood of erroneous liability are too small in relation to the cost savings from reducing security investments. This underdeterrence result is shown in Figure 4B, where the variance is doubled.

97.
Consider two situations. First, suppose a firm takes si ≥ s*, but the authority nonetheless finds it to be non-compliant. Here, the cost of the error to the firm is the penalty for noncompliance, which is assumed to be the harm caused at si (H(si)). Alternatively, suppose a firm
takes si < s*, but the authority erroneously finds it to have met the reasonableness standard. In
this instance, the benefit from the error is the only cost difference between si and s* (c(si)-c(s*)),
which will be less than consumer harm at si. Thus, because from a firm’s perspective, the costs
of being erroneously found liable is greater than the benefits of erroneously escaping liability,
firms rationally will over-invest in data security. This result will hold as long as security costs
do not rise too quickly, or enforcement errors are not too large.
98.
See generally Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON & ORG. 279 (1986) (deriving bounds for increased variance being associated with over- or under-deterrence).
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FIGURE 4A
NEGLIGENCE AND UNCERTAINTY (OVERDETERRENCE)
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FIGURE 4B
NEGLIGENCE + TREBLE DAMAGES AND MORE UNCERTAINTY
(UNDERDETERRENCE)
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Figure 4C shows the effect of sanctions or remedies that exceed harm
coupled with uncertain (yet unbiased) liability standards. While harm-based
penalties under-deter in this setting, treble damages will induce the firm to
spend more than s*. Thus, the presence of uncertain legal standards or enforcement eliminates one of the primary benefits of the ideal negligence system: the lack of sensitivity of incentive to the magnitude of the remedy.99 This
is due to the fact that there is no longer a sharp discontinuity in private costs
at the optimal level of care, s*; private costs are now a continuous function
of care because higher care reduces the likelihood of being held liable over
the entire distribution of possible levels of care that a regulatory body may
find to be optimal.

99.
If the agency is biased in the sense that liability is still stochastic, but the distribution
of liability standards is not centered around s*, a firm’s incentives will further depart from social
incentives. For example, if the agency systematically finds firms investing in sL < s* security in
compliance with the standard, firms’ will shift their expectations to center around sL, rather than
s*, which, ceteris paribus, will decrease their incentives to invest in security. The opposite conclusion would hold if the agency were biased in favor of finding liability.

286

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 28:257

FIGURE 4C
NEGLIGENCE + TREBLE DAMAGES AND MORE UNCERTAINTY
(OVERDETERRENCE)
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Unless the agency always accurately assesses both the optimal and the
actual levels of security for a given firm, firms will face a stochastic liability
standard. The results summarized in Table 1 show that this theory does not
provide a crisp prediction of whether a firm faced with stochastic liability will
over- or under-invest in security; it depends on the accuracy of the agency’s
liability decisions on average, as well as the variance of those decisions and
the marginal costs of precaution. Moreover, the magnitude of the sanction or
remedy imposed conditional on a breach occurring will alter the firm’s incentives to invest in security. Thus, a non-ideal negligence-type system requires
the enforcement agency to invest in the accuracy of both its liability determination and the size of its sanction.
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TABLE 1
FIRM SECURITY INCENTIVES WITH STOCHASTIC LIABILITY
Variance & Marginal Security Costs
Low
Average Agency Estimate
Of Liability Standard

s*

Over-deterrence

High
Under-deterrence

sL

?

Under-deterrence

sH

Over-deterrence

?

C. Strict Liability
In this Section we lay out the advantages of strict liability to an imperfect
negligence regime that is likely to arise when information is costly. First, we
show that like ideal negligence, ideal strict liability leads to optimal security
levels, but unlike negligence, it also incentivizes optimal levels of data collection. We then show that in the face of costly information, the incentives
produced by strict liability are more robust to errors in enforcement than those
produced by negligence because regulators only need to estimate damages.

1. Ideal Strict Liability
Unlike a negligence rule, a strict liability rule does not dictate a level of
security. Instead, it works by requiring a firm to pay for all the external harm
it causes regardless of the level of care taken. If a firm is forced to internalize
the harm, the firm’s profit maximization problem becomes identical to the
one that faces the social planner depicted in Figure 1 in Part III. Through this
mechanism, the firm will have incentives to take socially optimal security
precautions, s*, which will lead to socially optimal data collection decisions,
d*. This result contrasts with ideal negligence discussed in above in Part V.A.
because the firm is forced to internalize the harm that occurs even when optimal security measures are taken.

2. Strict Liability with Costly Information
For the same reasons that the determination of the negligence standard
can be subject to error, regulators also may estimate harm with error. When
penalties are stochastic, firms will base their actions on the expected
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penalty. 100 An important difference between negligence and strict liability
standards is the effect of unbiased error. As discussed above, in the case of
negligence, unbiased errors in determining compliance with the legal standard s* distort a firm’s incentives. An important advantage to strict liability is
that even if the agency estimates harm with error, as long as it is correct on
average, firms will still have incentives to invest optimally in security. This
is because firms base their security investments on ex-ante expected damage
payments, which will yield optimal incentives when expected damage payments are equal to harm. 101 This result is the dotted line in Figure 5, which
traces the total social cost curve with accurate damages.
FIGURE 5
STRICT LIABILITY
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As in the case of negligence, however, if an agency systematically overor under- estimates injury, a firm will invest in too much or too little security
compared to the social optimum, respectively. 102 The case where an expected
fine equal to three times harm is shown in Figure 5. The dashed line is a firm’s
expected costs if expected penalties are equal to harm. When firms expect
penalties to be three times actual harm, their expected harm plus security costs
100.
The expected magnitude of the fine conditional on a breach is כ ݀ = )݁݊݅ܨ(ܧ
݂݀)݂(݂݃ , where d is the number of records, f is the estimate of the harm based fine, g(f) is the
distribution of estimates, and df is the differential term.
101.
As noted above, with stochastic damages, firms minimize expected total security and
breach costs. If the ex-post estimate of E(Fine) equals is unbiased, then the harm per record can
be written as [݄(݉)] + ɂ, where ɂ is a random error term with mean 0 and variance ߪ ଶ. Under
these conditions, the expected fine will equal:  )݉(݄[ כ ݀ = )݁݊݅ܨ(ܧ+ (݂ ߝ ɂ)dߝ ]. The last
term is the mean of the error term ɂ, which is zero by definition. Thus, the magnitude of the
expected fine equals ݀ ])݉(݄[ כ, leading firms to choose s*and d*. See generally Kaplow, supra note 92; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L.
& ECON. 191 (1996).
102.
This is because the distribution of the agency estimates (g(f)) will not be centered on
actual harm per record [݄(݉) + ݁(݉)], but instead around over- or under-estimates of actual
harm.
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rise to the solid line, and they over invest in security sH > s*. Conversely,
Figure 5 shows expected firm costs when penalties are half actual harm,
which leads them to under invest in security sL < s*.
There is an important difference between systematic errors with regard
to the level of care in a negligence regime and in damages in a strict liability
regime. As shown above, because the negligence rule sets up a discontinuity
around the standard of care required by the authority, there are strong incentives to calibrate actual care to what the regulatory authority requires. Take
the extreme example of a biased standard of care with no error: ܵሚ which is
twice as much as s*. As seen in the previous Section, as long as ܵሚ is not too
large and costs do not rise too quickly, it is optimal for a firm to always take
ܵሚ because it will reduce expected damage payments to zero. That is, in the
relevant range, overinvestment in security moves one-to-one with the erroneous liability standard. On the other hand, if damages are overestimated by
100% with certainty, a rational firm will not increase its level of care by
100%. 103 This is because privately optimal care under strict liability is continuous; although an increase in expected damages above actual harm results
in incentives to take additional care above s*, this decision is tempered by the
fact that extra care is costly and only marginally reduces expected damages.

D. The Advantage of Strict Liability
The analysis above demonstrates some of the advantages of a regulatory
structure based on strict liability over one based on negligence. First, the
agency does not have to specify optimal levels of precaution or activity
level. 104 The agency would not have to estimate optimal or actual levels of
security investments, which are likely to be idiosyncratic and multidimensional. 105 Instead, for strict liability to function, the agency must estimate only
expected consumer harm resulting from a breach, which is likely to be less
prone to the type of errors that distort firms’ incentives. Firms, in turn, would
be allowed to decide for themselves how much to spend on data security and
mitigation, and to decide how much data to collect, use, and retain based on
their expectations of the harm that their data collecting activities are likely to
cause. Importantly, these decisions will be based on firms’ private knowledge
of the costs of prevention and the benefits of increasing their level of spending
on data security. If the firms’ private knowledge is superior to the knowledge

103.
For example, in the model in the Appendix that supports all of the results presented
డ௦ כ
ଵ
=
< 1.
in the Article,
డு
ఒு
104.
Mark A. Geistfield, Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted to Others in Business Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Tort Liability, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 385
(2017); Citron, supra note 35; Shavell, supra note 93.
105.
See generally Mark F. Grady, Multiple Tortfeasors and the Economy of Prevention,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 653 (1990); Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 887 (1994).
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of the agency—which is almost certainly the case—the choices are likely to
better reflect the costs and benefits of such activity as long the remedies force
firms to fully internalize the costs generated by a breach.
Second, strict liability is more robust than negligence to the type of enforcement errors that are likely to accompany any standard in employed in
the real world. As long as the agency’s harm estimates are correct on average,
firm and social incentives to invest in security are more likely to be aligned
than under a stochastic negligence rule. 106 Further, biased estimates of harm
have less impact on firm care and data collection incentives than do biased
estimates of optimal care.
Third, because firms internalize all of the harm they cause, a strict liability rule is likely to provide both consumers and firms with the improved incentives with respect to data sharing. Under a negligence-based approach to
data security, consumers bear the residual risk of data breaches that occur
even when firms take optimal care. Under a strict liability approach, firms
bear this risk. If firms have superior information about this residual risk relative to consumers, and this risk is passed along to consumers in the form of
higher prices or fewer requests for data, levels of data sharing will be more
efficient.
Fourth, there are also benefits that would accrue directly to the FTC.
Strict liability will reduce the level of per-case resources. For example, staff
would no longer need to investigate a defendant’s data security methods or
work with internal or external experts to assess the reasonableness of these
methods. Because each case only would require estimating harm, the FTC
staff could increase the number of data security cases it handles with the same
level of resources. A strict liability approach will also have the collateral benefit of allowing the FTC to avoid the difficulties in complying with the Eleventh Circuit’s LabMD decision. 107 In LabMD, the FTC had alleged that a
medical testing firm failed to take reasonable security measures when an employee had exposed a file containing sensitive medical information to a peerto-peer network. 108 Because the FTC presented no evidence of actual harm,
and because the data in question had not been seen by anyone other than FTC
staff and the forensics firm that discovered the data, the ALJ found that FTC
had not satisfied the “likelihood of substantial consumer injury” element of
unfairness. 109 The FTC reversed the ALJ’s ruling, finding that the increased
risk of harm from exposure of the data to the peer-to-peer network presented
a sufficiently high likelihood of substantial injury. 110 The heart of the FTC’s
106.
The estimate of ex-ante expected damages should reflect factors known to the firm
at the time it makes its decision to collect, use, and protect data. See generally Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 101.
107.
LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018).
108.
Id. at 1224–25.
109.
Initial Decision, LabMD, Inc., supra note 48, at 88.
110.
Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., supra note 48, at 25.
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order required LabMD to develop a data security program “that is reasonably
designed” to protect the personal information it collects and to design and
implement “reasonable safeguards to control the risks” to the personal information it holds. 111 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit sidestepped the injury issue, and instead held that the FTC’s order was unenforceable due to vagueness because it “commands LabMD to overhaul and replace its data-security
program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness.” 112 In response, the FTC has been forced to mandate more specific requirements in its
data security orders. 113 A strict liability regime would relieve the FTC of the
burden of crafting and monitoring orders with bespoke and specific security
requirements—which are taxing on staff resources—in order to comply with
LabMD.
Finally, by vesting a single national enforcer with the authority to levy
deterring payments to remedy harmful breaches, a strict liability approach
will solve the tort system’s inability to provide adequate deterrence. Although
major (and minor) data breaches often spawn private class actions, these cases
often run into roadblocks due to an inability to make sufficient showings of
harm, either at the standing stage or as an element of cause of action. 114 When
plaintiffs lack evidence that the breach in question actually led to harm (e.g.,
evidence of new or existing account fraud), 115 courts have generally rejected
the plaintiffs’ claims as too speculative, because an increased risk of harm
without more fails to satisfy the requirement in federal court that injuries must
be “‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.’” 116 Substituting a strict liability regime administered by the
FTC for private tort actions would have two clear benefits. First, because the
FTC does not have to satisfy standing requirements, it can force firms to internalize the expected harm they cause, even if it is unrealized. Second, a
111.
Final Order, LabMD, Inc., supra note 55, at 2.
112.
LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236.
113.
More specific requirements in its data security orders can be seen in the FTC’s case
against LightYear Dealer Technologies, LLC (also known as DealerBuilt). As Chairman Simons noted in announcing this case: “The settlement with DealerBuilt imposes more specific
security requirements and requires company executives to take more responsibility for order
compliance, while also strengthening the third party assessor’s accountability and providing the
FTC with additional tools for oversight.” Auto Dealer Software Provider Settles FTC Data Security Allegations, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 12, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events
/press-releases/2019/06/auto-dealer-software-provider-settles-ftc-data-security.
114.
See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of DataBreach Harm, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 748–54 (2018).
115.
Some courts have found harm sufficient for standing purposes when there is evidence
that the data are in the hands of hackers who have malicious intent and there is some evidence
of extant fraud. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2015)
(evidence of some fraudulent charges for some customers); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of fraudulent attempt to open a bank account with
data from breach).
116.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see Solove & Citron, supra note 114, at 748–54 (collecting cases).
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court-administered negligence regime for those private cases with sufficiently
concrete harm for standing is likely to suffer from the same informational
problems as the FTC’s current approach. Thus, moving toward an FTCadministered strict liability regime would generate more efficient incentives
for firms.

E. Strict Liability as a Facilitator for Cyber Insurance
An important collateral benefit of moving from a regulatory regime based
on negligence to one based on strict liability is that a strict liability regime
improves the ability for cyber insurers to function as de facto regulators. It
has long been recognized that liability insurers provide valuable services beyond indemnification. 117 Insurance companies, through risk management
programs, provide standard setting and safety monitoring roles designed to
manage and reduce the risk to those they insure. Although this proposition
may at first blush seem counterintuitive—after all, insurance companies are
in the business of providing protection against risk—the ability to coax their
insured to take cost effective steps to reduce risk will allow an insurance company to charge lower premiums and hence to be more competitive. For example, Shavell shows that if an insurer can observe and contract on an insured’s level of care, liability insurance will lead to first-best outcomes
because the insurer will translate efficient risk-reducing actions into premium
reductions that are larger than the marginal cost of precaution. 118 Insurance
companies have several tools at their disposal to create incentives for their
clients to take efficient risk-reducing measures, including refusing to insure,
underwriting based on risk through “feature ratings” or “experience ratings,”
and providing their own best practices concerning risk reduction or loss mitigation that come from industry-wide knowledge and internal research. 119 In
this manner, liability insurance that links premiums to care can ameliorate
moral hazard, even with full insurance.
What is more, if the insurance company has better information than the
firm about the link between care and harm, liability insurance can improve
outcomes—and there are reasons to believe that this may be the case in a wide
variety of circumstances. For example, liability insurers will have access to
information gleaned from experiences across an industry and thus can serve
as “specialized outsiders,” providing advice to firms on how to reduce the
likelihood and severity of accidents. 120 Indeed, some have argued that the
117.
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012); Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff,
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1412 (2013).
118.
Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982).
119.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 117, at 206–18.
120.
See Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541, 543 (2009); see also Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther &
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risk-reducing ancillary services provided by insurance, rather than the risk
bearing itself, is the primary explanation as to why risk neutral parties who
can afford to self-insure might nonetheless purchase liability insurance. 121
Cyber insurance is a relatively recent product, but is among the fastest
growing lines of insurance, with estimated annual growth rates of 27% across
all industries. 122 Further, there are now over 500 insurance carriers in the
United States offering some form of cyber insurance, with average coverage
between $10 million and $25 million. 123 A recent survey of cyber insurance
policies finds that insurers are underwriting losses related to government penalties and private claims arising out of data breaches, which suggests that insurers are employing many of the risk-reducing tools used in general liability
insurance policies to cyber insurance policies. 124 They find, for instance, that
insurers collected information through detailed questionnaires designed to assess a firm’s risk profile. 125 Information collected included the sensitivity and
volume of data a firm handles, a firm’s compliance with government and industry data security standards, and a firm’s data breach history. 126
Although the methods of pricing risk vary and are based on limited information about the relationship between certain practices and risks, most
cyber insurers appear to set prices based on estimated risk profiles. For example, cyber insurers will look to a firm’s history of data breach incidents or
to its propensity to engage in a “high hazard” business, where lots of business
is conducted online and involves sensitive consumer data, in deciding
whether to charge a higher insurance premium. 127 A majority of sampled policies based premium adjustments on a firm’s answers to a security questionnaire that inquired about the quality of a firm’s “privacy controls,” “network
Matthew W. White, Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance
Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325 (2011) (providing evidence
that the existence of private liability insurance for underground storage tanks reduced environmental damage).
121.
Goldberg notes that the Hartford Boiler Insurance and Inspection Company began as
only an inspection company, but evolved to provide insurances as a way to share the risk associated with a boiler accident after an inspection. Goldberg, supra note 120, at 543; see also Tom
Baker, Back to the Future of Cyber Insurance, 3 PROF. LIAB. UNDERWRITING SOC’Y J. 1 (2019)
(discussing multiple ways beyond risk transfer that cyber insurers manage uncertainty in selling
cyber insurance); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 117 (discussing the role of insurance companies in managing risk and the role of mandatory cyber insurance for firms that collect, store
and use data).
122.
Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon, Andreas Kuehn & Therese Jones, Content Analysis
of Cyber Insurance Policies: How Do Carriers Price Cyber Risk?, 5 J. CYBERSECURITY 1, 2
(2019); see also Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 417
(2017).
123.
Romanosky et al., supra note 122, at 2.
124.
Id. at 6–7.
125.
Id. at 8–12.
126.
Id. at 9–11.
127.
Id. at 14–15. High sales volumes or assets will also tend to lead to higher premiums.
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security controls,” “content liability controls,” “laptop and mobile device security policy,” and “incident response plan.” 128 Importantly, these are all factors under a firm’s control, which means that they have incentives to take
private actions that reduce risk as long as the marginal precaution cost is less
than the premium reduction. Although it is unclear the extent to which prices
currently reflect actual risk, as insurers gain knowledge about the relationship
between certain practices and the marginal reduction in risk, one would expect underwriting accuracy—and hence the ability to use premiums to create
incentives for firms to take efficient precautions—to grow. 129 Some policies
also use exclusions to temper moral hazard, for example, by covering claims
arising out of “deceptive or unfair trade practices” involving “theft, loss, or
unauthorized disclosure” of personal information, but excluding incidents in
which the insured “colluded in the theft, loss, or unauthorized disclosure.”130
In addition to using pricing and exclusions to affect a company’s cyber
security practices, cyber insurers also provide a variety of risk-management
tools to their clients. As one study of cyber insurance practice explained, “insurance institutions are doing something more than transferring risks—they
are actively managing the underlying risk of data breach.” 131 For example,
cyber insurers typically provide a security assessment of an insured’s systems, audit written handbooks and training material for legal compliance,
train employees on best practices, and assess the risks posed by third-party
vendors. 132 Cyber insurers also provide a robust suite of post-breach tools that
help clients respond, investigate, and mitigate the harm resulting from a
breach, such as providing access to expert legal teams.133 As one study concludes, “the insurance company, through the risk management services it offers with cyber insurance, largely drives the company’s incident response
when a data loss occurs.” 134 It appears that some cyber insurance companies
anticipate that their services will mitigate losses in the event of a breach. One
policy, for example, developed premiums based in part on an FTC estimate
of consumers’ costs from identity theft and adjusted premiums downward by

128.
Id. at 16 tbl.13. Romanosky et al., find some more sophisticated approaches, including rating a firm’s overall security posture along six dimensions (data classification, security
infrastructure, governance, risk and compliance, payment card controls, media controls, and
computer systems interruption loss). Id. at 17.
129.
Id. at 16.
130.
Id. at 7. Excluding coverage of “inside jobs” is common in policies covering theft,
and is a recognition that firms are in a better position than insurance companies to police their
employees. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 275–
76 (Minn. 1985).
131.
Talesh, supra note 122, at 428.
132.
Id. at 429–31. The outcome of these risk assessments can impact insurance premiums. See id. at 429.
133.
Id. at 432.
134.
Id.
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almost eighty percent due to the client’s anticipated use of the recommended
“case management restoration services.”135
The role of liability insurance plays in shaping firm behavior depends on
the underlying liability regime. For example, in a world where data handlers
face no liability for breaches, first-party insurance would be the primary form
of coverage: consumers would either self-insure or purchase some type of
policy to protect them from identity theft. Firms facing no liability for data
breaches would not choose to purchase cyber insurance. Although it may mitigate consumer moral hazard with respect to providing personal data to firms,
first-party insurance would have no impact on data handlers’ incentives to
take care.
Alternatively, in either a negligence or a strict liability regime, claims
would be handled by third-party liability insurance policies owned by data
handlers. Although both negligence and strict liability will facilitate the ability of liability insurers to regulate data security precautions via contract, there
are reasons to believe that strict liability will lead to superior outcomes. To
see this, it is important to note that the underlying liability regime is what
triggers an obligation for the insurance company to pay. This is the mechanism that allows insurance to translate the incentives created by a liability
regime into prices that impact care decisions. 136 Accordingly, it follows that
regulation by contract between insurers and data handlers will mimic whatever errors are present in the underlying liability-determining process.
Under the current FTC framework, liability is triggered when the FTC
determines that data security measures are unreasonable, so liability insurers
use the tools at their disposal to move insureds to comply with the FTC standard. As discussed in Part IV, if levels of care are measured with error, or if
the standard of reasonable care is stochastic—even if optimal on average—
then the privately optimal level of care is unlikely to be optimal. Thus, the
privately optimal contract between a liability insurer and its data handler client will be calibrated to this suboptimal standard of care, rather than optimal
care. On the other hand, under the strict liability regime described in Part III,
liability is triggered whenever the firm has a breach that impacts consumers,
rather than when it fails to meet an imprecise standard articulated by the FTC.
As long as damages are measured accurately on average, the contracts between liability insurers and data handlers will be calibrated to optimal care.
Further, the advantages from strict liability that flow from harnessing a
firm’s private information about the marginal costs and benefits from taking
precautions are likely to be amplified when coupled with liability insurance.
As discussed above, one of the primary values of liability insurance derives
from an insurer’s broad knowledge of industry best practices. In some contexts, unreasonableness determinations by the FTC may be useful in
135.
136.

Romanosky et al., supra note 122, at 12 n.36.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 117, at 234.
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providing information to data handlers on where due care standards lie. 137
However, even assuming that FTC liability determinations are accurate representations of optimal care, cyber insurers are likely to be able to duplicate
this information propagation function via private contract at a lower cost and
with accuracy tailored to each firm. 138

VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
In this Part, we lay out some of the details that would be involved in
setting up a strict liability regime administered by the FTC. First, we discuss
how harm would be calculated, and then, we identify necessary legislative
changes to the FTC Act. Finally, we address potential concerns that may result in political opposition to our approach.

A. Calculating Penalties
A strict liability standard would require the FTC to levy a monetary penalty on firms when their breaches harm consumers. The goal of the monetary
relief imposed by the FTC should be to ensure that firms fully internalize the
external harms that their data security practice impose on third parties. Ideally, a strict liability approach would be based on actual harm. In the data
security context, however, harm is difficult to measure given the problems
associated with tracing an instance of an identity fraud to a specific breach.
This is especially true given the non-trivial baseline level of identity fraud
risk that exists due to the overall prevalence of data breach. Thus, strict liability should be triggered by a data breach that increases the risk of identity
fraud. Accordingly, a necessary predicate for a functioning strict liability
standard using harm-based penalties is some form of a breach notification
requirement that would reliably alert the FTC of breaches in a timely manner.
Failure to comply with such a requirement could be deterred either by increasing sanctions to reflect the additional harm caused by noncompliance,
or by adding a multiplier to reflect attempts to evade liability. 139

137.
See Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, Liability Insurance Under the Negligence
Rule, 40 RAND J. ECON. 486, 487 (2009) (describing the useful role of negligence determinations when insurers cannot contract ex-ante on care levels); see also Surajeet Chakravarty, David Kelsey & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Tort Liability and Unawareness 3 (Apr. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179753 (“Under negligence, however, the
litigation provides the world with more information. In particular, the court’s stipulation of a
new due care standard serves as a knowledge transmission mechanism, providing the world
with information about the updated probability of harm.”).
138.
See, e.g., Citron, supra note 35, at 266–67 (noting that as cyber insurance markets
evolve, “database operators that continue collecting sensitive information will be better position
to assess the cost of residual risk”).
139.
Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang & Alessandro Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256 (2011).
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Assuming the FTC can detect harmful breaches, penalties should be set
equal to expected harm that includes the direct consumer losses from fraudulent charges or identity theft (to the extent traceable). Further, when there is
no evidence of direct harm, the FTC can estimate increased risk of harm from
breaches of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) using public and private
data from the breached firm. 140 This estimate should be current, unbiased, and
vary based on the type of data and the length of time since the breach. For
example, recent data suggest that around 6.5% of the population suffered
some form of identity theft in 2017, but of those consumers who received at
least one breach notification, 18.5% suffered some form of identity fraud.141
These data do not establish the marginal impact of breach on the incidence of
identity fraud, but they do imply that on average, when a consumer’s data are
exposed to at least one reported breach in a year, their odds of identity fraud
increase by a factor of 3.25. 142 This increase in risk could be married with an
estimate of monetary losses when financial data is at stake. Where the price
of sensitive PII has no readily available market price (e.g., sensitive health
information), the FTC would need to conduct its own study, or rely on existing empirical estimates of willingness to pay for privacy protection to arrive
at statutory damages. Further, penalties would reflect the mitigated level of
harm as well as the ex-post costs that consumer incurs to mitigate harm. 143
The FTC should limit actions to breaches that impact consumers, and any
monetary relief imposed by the FTC should reflect remedies imposed by
140.
PII are data that can be used to identify a person. Examples include a person’s name,
social security and driver’s license numbers, physical and e-mail addresses, and birthdates. The
FTC has a broad definition of PII, and “now regard[s] data as personally identifiable when it
can be reasonably linked to a particular person, computer, or device.” Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Digital Age: Reaffirming the Role of Consumer Control 3–4 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements
/980623/ramirez_-_protecting_consumer_privacy_in_digital_age_aspen_8-22-16.pdf.
141.
See Al Pascual, Address at the Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Competition and Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century 41–45 (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1418261/ftc_hearings_session_9_transcript_day_1_12-11-18.pdf.
(ூ|)
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, where P(I) is the
142.
Using the odds formulation of Bayes’ Rule
(ேூ|)

(|ேூ)
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probability of injury from a breach, P(NI) is the probability of no injury from a breach, and P(B)
is the probability of breach. Substituting in values for P(I), P(NI), P(I|B), and P(NI|B) from AL
PASCUAL, KYLE MARCHINI & SARAH MILLER, JAVELIN STRATEGY, 2018 IDENTITY FRAUD:
(|ூ)
FRAUD ENTERS A NEW ERA OF COMPLEXITY (2018), and solving for
, results in 3.24.
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For further discussion of the correlation between exposure to a breach and odds of experiencing
fraud, see Pascual, supra note 141.
143.
Mitigation expenditures would include time and resources costs involved in minimizing the odds of identity fraud post breach, for example, by purchasing credit monitoring or
credit freezes or ordering new credit or debit cards. It is irrelevant whether the firm reimburses
consumers for this cost or pays for it directly (e.g., by purchasing credit monitoring services for
all affected consumers). See generally Donald Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs:
Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1981).
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others, including redress or mitigation expenditures already paid by the
breached firm to consumers. 144 Further, the FTC should avoid taking action
when a clear contractual relationship between consumers and the firm allocates risks from a data breach. Grafting an ex-post FTC remedy to existing
contractual obligations could dampen incentives to allocate risk efficiently
ex-ante and increase the cost of contracting.145
We also think that the FTC should limit actions to remedy harm caused
by custodians of consumer data, and not reach the sale of products that consumers use to transmit data, such as routers, or other connected devices. In
these cases, the problems of causation and information asymmetry, while not
absent, are not as stark as in the case of data custodians. Accordingly, it is
better to allow the market and the contract between the consumer and the firm
to govern the level of data security promised, with the FTC’s ability to police
misrepresentations about security as a backstop. 146

B. Necessary Legislative Fixes
A fully operationalized version of our strict liability approach would require Congress to provide the FTC with additional authority. As discussed in
Part II, the FTC is currently unable to secure remedies that approximate consumer harm from a breach. 147 Because its current tools are not up to the task,
the FTC must obtain additional legislative authority to levy damages on firms
144.
This is because a firm should pay for steps consumers take to mitigate harm, and thus
should get credit for these expenditures if taken prior to an FTC action. Our proposal envisions
the FTC administered regime preempting state and private actions. However, if this were not
the case, a breached firm should also receive credit for civil damages and penalties imposed by
private litigants and other governmental actors. As noted above, under state law, tort liability
for data security lapses may be limited or even precluded. See Sharkey, supra note 86, at 342.
In theory, the FTC remedy should also take into account market imposed reputational losses
imposed on breached firms. See generally Jonathan M Karpoff & John R. Lott, The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J. L. & ECON. 757 (1993) (analyzing optimal criminal penalties in the presence of market imposed reputational penalties).
See also Joshua Mitts and Eric Talley, Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches, 9 HARV.
BUS. L. REV 1 (2019) (documenting the negative abnormal stock price effects suffered by
breached firms and firms with inadequate levels of cybersecurity).
145.
To the extent that promises of certain levels of data security are deemed to create a
contract, the proper remedy would be under the contract, not an FTC action. However, courts
have almost uniformly rejected the notion that privacy policies constitute contracts between
firms and consumers. See, e.g., In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Priv. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299,
324–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199–200
(D.N.D. 2004).
146.
For example, the Northern District of California rejected a claim based on an insecure
device that was likely to cause harm in D-Link. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys. Inc., No.
17-cv-00039, 2017 WL 65168 at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017). Although the court dismissed
the FTC’s unfairness claim as too tenuous, it rejected plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the FTC’s
claim that it’s data security promises were deceptive under § 5. Id. at *2–3, *6.
147.
The FTC also enforces a variety of rules, many of which allow for civil penalties. 15
U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A). The focus of this Article, however, is on the use of the FTC’s UDAP
authority under § 5.
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that are tethered to consumer harms related to data breaches. The good news
is that the time is ripe for reform, as Congress considers how to restore the
FTC’s remedial powers in the wake of AMG.
One path could be to provide the FTC with the specific authority to fine
breaching firms an amount equal to an estimate of consumer harm, or to provide a general civil penalty authority, with a requirement that the penalty is
based on consumer harm. 148 Further, any legislation should include rulemaking authority to allow the FTC to require breach notification, establish parameters for financial harms, and set statutory penalties for non-financial harms.
Finally, any legislation should preempt state and common law causes of action to allow the FTC to become the sole data security enforcer. Not only
would competing state and private actions sounding in negligence dilute the
benefits of a national strict liability standard, but as discussed below, it would
likely be a political concession necessary to help allay business concerns.
In addition to new authority, depending on the thresholds for breach reporting, the FTC would likely require additional resources to handle the volume of cases. For example, one estimate finds that in 2018 there were 1,079
data breaches involving non-governmental entities. 149 If even ten percent of
these breaches were reportable to the FTC under a strict liability standard,
this represents a marked increase in the number of data security cases that
staff currently handles annually. But, because the resources per case would
be dramatically reduced, an increased caseload would not require a proportional increase in resources.

C. Possible Concerns
Any strict liability regime is likely to engender political opposition from
businesses, especially because there is probably no level of care that would
insulate a firm from suffering a breach and thus from paying damages. However, there are reasons to believe that these concerns could be assuaged.
First, by eliminating the need to calibrate their actions to an uncertain
FTC standard, strict liability would provide firms with increased regulatory
certainty, which will reduce compliance costs. Further, cyber insurance will
allow residual risk to be efficiently transferred and converted into a fixed cost.
Second, including a preemption provision would insulate firms from private and state suits, which is likely to result in lower levels of liability and
litigation costs overall. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which sets
148.
The FTC Act currently provides that civil penalties for knowing violations of order
provisions and rules be based on “the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct,
ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may
require.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C).
149.
Of the 1,079 data breaches, 571 involved businesses, 363 involved the healthcare
sector, and 135 involved the financial sector. Joseph Johnson, Number of Data Breaches in the
United States from 2013 to 2019, by Industry, STATISTA (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273572/number-of-data-breaches-in-the-united-states-by-business.
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out robust federal requirements and severely curtails private actions under
FCRA and state law, could provide a model. 150 For example, enacting legislation could vest all federal enforcement authority with the FTC, preempt
states from enforcing their own data security laws, and limit private negligence actions to those involving malice or willful intent to injure. 151 Even
leaving the explicit preemption aside, a reform that eliminates the reasonableness inquiry would remove the ability of class action plaintiffs to use a
negligence per se theory based on an alleged breach of the FTC’s Section 5
standard. 152
A third way to alleviate business concerns is to ensure that any legislation
or rulemaking exclude certain breaches caused by highly sophisticated attacks, such as those by state actors. It could also set a de minimis threshold
for payment based on the size and sensitivity of data breached. This would
have a collateral benefit of creating incentives for some firms to forego the
collection of large volumes of sensitive data. 153 What is more, initially, legislation could also limit the use of strict liability regimes to specific settings,
e.g., to settings where market mechanisms for cost internalization are weak,
or where current remedies are inadequate to align private and social incentives. For example, data brokers and credit reporting agencies have large
stores of sensitive consumer information, but these entities are typically not
consumer-facing, and thus may be especially unlikely to have sufficient private incentives to take care with consumer data. 154
Another possible argument against strict liability is that it may lead to
consumer moral hazard: if consumers are fully insured against harm from
breaches, they will lack incentives to take cost-effective precautions (such as
utilizing different passwords or creating strong passwords), or they may share
too much data with firms. However, the likely inability of consumers to

150.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1) (preempting the application of state laws with respect to certain duties required by FCRA).
151.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (limiting state actions for negligence, invasion of privacy,
or defamation related to consumer reports to cases in which the defendant acted with “malice”
or “willful intent to injure”).
152.
See, e.g., In re Equifax, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295,
1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2019). Plaintiffs also use the § 5 standard to make out claims under California’s Business and Professions Code § 17200. See, e.g., Complaint at 30, Rahman v. Marriot
Int’l, Inc., Case No. 8:20-cv-00654, 2021 WL 346421 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2020).
153.
However, when applied, a strict liability framework generally should avoid safe harbors, as they merely replace ex-post determination of reasonableness after a triggering event
with ex-ante determination of compliance with a standard. In this way, the determination and
use of safe harbor thresholds can destroy informational benefits from strict liability.
154.
See, e.g., Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act of 2018, S. 2289, 115th
Cong. (2018) (imposing strict liability and federal notification requirements on credit reporting
agencies for data breaches). The bill provides civil penalties of $100 for each consumer whose
name and at least one item of personally identifying information was compromised, plus an
additional $50 for each additional item of personally identifying information compromised for
each consumer. Id. § 4(b)(2)(A).
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appreciate the marginal impact of certain precautions on expected harm or the
residual risk associated with sharing data conditional on certain precautions
suggests that strict liability is unlikely to have a significant impact on consumer behavior. Indeed, to the extent that firms pass expected liability costs
to consumers, consumers will engage in more efficient levels of data sharing.
Finally, if firms pay damages to the Treasury rather than to consumers, consumers will feel the costs of data breach, providing them with incentives to
take efficient precautions, mitigate harms ex-post, or to insure against harmful breaches.

VII. CONCLUSION
An optimal enforcement program for data security should require firms
to internalize the external harm of their data security practices. Two facets of
the FTC’s current approach to data security enforcement program render it
unsuitable to provide firms with correct incentives to invest in data security.
First, its reasonableness requirements are opaque and estimated with error
due to poor information, leaving firms uncertain about whether they are in
compliance with Section 5. Second, the FTC is unable to obtain remedies that
are systematically related to the harms that consumers are likely to suffer
from data breaches.
Accordingly, we recommend that as Congress considers legislation to
address privacy and data security concerns, it should seriously consider reforms that would give the FTC sufficient powers to operationalize a strict
liability approach to data security cases with civil penalty authority. This approach has several advantages over the FTC’s current data security program.
First, it would harness firms’ (and cyber insurers’) superior private information about the specific costs and benefits of protecting consumer data,
leading to more efficient levels of security. Second, the ability to levy civil
penalties would allow the FTC to force firms to fully internalize the expected
harms generated by their data security decisions. Finally, this approach not
only would increase the efficacy of FTC enforcement, but it also would provide firms with legal certainty and readily insurable residual risk. Removing
reasonableness from the FTC’s approach to data security is the only reasonable path.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we set out the specific model of security expenditures
used in the body of the Article.
Definitions:
s i = security level of firm i.
ߖ(s i ) = probability of a breach at firm I, ߖ’(s) < 0, ߖ”(s) > 0.
c(s i ) = total cost of security.
m i = per data record mitigation level by firm i.
h(m i ) = per data record mitigated harm conditional on a breach.
e(m i ) = total mitigation cost per data record.
d i = data collected by firm i.
w(d) = total cost of data collection, use, and storage.
A1: Independent Harms
As a benchmark, consider a single site that houses unique data of size d,
and that a data breach of that site would cause expected harm equal to H(d, s,
m). In the partial equilibrium model used, the problem for the social planner
is to maximize the value of the data net of the costs of a potential breach and
the cost of security expenditures. In particular, the social problem is to choose
the level of data retained d and security and mitigation expenditures (s and
m) in order to maximize:
ܹ(ݏ, ݉, ݀) = ܶܲ(݀) െ ݀(ܪ, ݏ, ݉) െ ߱(݀,  )ݏെ ܿ(݀, )ݏ

(1)

The first order conditions are given by:
ܸ )݀(ܲܯെ
െ
െ

డ[ு(ௗ,௦,)]
డௗ
డ[ு(ௗ,௦,)]
డ௦
డ[ு(ௗ,௦,)]
డ

െ
െ

డఠ(ௗ,௦)
డௗ
డఠ(ௗ,௦)
డ௦
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െ

డ(ௗ,௦)
డௗ
డ(ௗ,௦)
డ௦

=0

=0

(2d)

=0

(2s)
(2m)

The Figures in the body of the Article depict this outcome for the following specific functional forms and parameters. In particular, we assume that
the expected harm from a breach equals:
݀(ܪ, ݏ, ݉) = ߶( )݉(݄[݀ כ )ݏ+ ݁(݉)]

(3)

where h(m) is the mitigated per unit harm generated from exposure of a unit
of data d, e(m) is the cost of firm’s mitigation expenditures of m per exposed
record, and ߖ(s) is the probability a breach occurs given a level of security
expenditures s. In particular, we assume that this probability equals:
߶(ି ݁ߣ = )ݏఒ௦ , ߶Ԣ( = )ݏെߣଶ ݁ ିఒ௦

(4)
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The cost of data security, mitigation expenditures, and the acquisition
cost of data are given by:
ܿ(ݏ כ ݇ = )ݏ

(5)

݁(݉) = ݉ כ ݖ

(6)

߱(݀) = ݀ כ ݓ

(7)

Finally, we assume that the value of the marginal product of data is linear
and diminishing (g < 0), and given by:
ܸ ܾ = )݀(ܲܯ+ ݃݀

(8)

Under assumptions (3)–(7) the first order conditions become:
ܾ + ݃  ݀ כെ  ݓെ ߶( = ݄ כ )ݏ0

(2d’)

െ߶Ԣ( ݀ כ ݄ כ )ݏെ ݇ = 0

(2s’)

െ݄ᇱ (݉) െ  = ݖ0

(2m’)

Simultaneously solving (2d’), (2s’) and (2m’) yields the values (s*, m*,
d*) that maximize equation (1). The graphs in the body of the Article assume
the following parameter values:
k=2
w=2
h = 50
b=6
g = -.4
A2: Common Harm
To see how the optimal security expenditures change in the presence of
interdependent security, consider a setting where all N symmetric firms in an
industry collect, use, and store the same data. Let ߖ i (s i ) = ߶( )ݏdenote the
probability that a breach occurs at site i given symmetric security expenditures s i = s. Let B denote the number of sites that are breached.
Suppose that a breach of one or more sites results in common harm Hc =
݀[݄(݉) + ݁(݉)]. That is, a breach of one site is sufficient to cause the common harm, and breaches of additional sites do not cause marginal harm.
Given that the same harm occurs when there is one or more breaches (B > 0),
the probability of a breach event that generates the common harm is ܲ(> ܤ
0). With a common equilibrium level of security s for all symmetric firms,
the probability of no breach equals:
ே!

ܲ = ܤ(ܾݎ0) = -- ߶()ݏ (1 െ ߶())ݏே
ே!!

(9)

The probability harm is generated is the probability of one or more breach,
or:
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1 െ ܲ = ܤ(ܾݎ0) = 1 െ (1 െ ߶())ݏே

(10)

The expected harm will equal:
ே

݀(ܪ, ݏ, ݉) = ቂ1 – ൫1 െ ߶()ݏ൯ ቃ ݀[݄(݉) + ݁(݉)] െ ܰܿ()ݏ

(11)

First order condition for s is:
డு(ௗ,௦,)
డ௦

= െܰ[1 െ ߶(])ݏேିଵ ߶ ͛ ( )݉(݄[݀)ݏ+ ݁(݉)] െ ܰܿ ͛ ( = )ݏ0,

or equivalently:
െ[1 െ ߶(])ݏேିଵ ߶ ͛ ( )݉(݄[݀)ݏ+ ݁(݉)] = ܿ ͛ ()ݏ

(12)

ேିଵ

Note that when the term [1 െ ߶(])ݏ
= 1, the first order condition is
equivalent to the first order condition in the non-interdependent case set out
above. Compared to the optimal level of security in that case s*, and given
that [1 െ ߶(])ݔேିଵ  1, it follows that s** < s*. The term [1 െ ߶(])ݔேିଵ
represents a “contagion tax” that reduces the incremental value of marginal
expenditures aimed at a protecting an individual site. Intuitively, the potential
that the common harm is caused by a breach at some other site j = 2, … , N
reduces the value of preventing a breach at site = 1. Figure A1 illustrates the
effect of security interdependence on the marginal incentives to invest in security.
Figure Al- Interdependent Security
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